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In our article [1], we claim that the inequality in our
Eq. (F.3), namely,
η ≤ 1
N
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |2∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |
, (1)
where ~mX1...XN ≡
∑
N
k=1
Xknˆk, is a necessary condition
for joint measurability of noisy spin observables along
axes {nˆk : k ∈ {1, . . . , N}}, but this claim is incorrect.
Our mistake was in the paragraph between Eq. (F.11)
and Eq. (F.12). The vector described by Eq. (F.12) does
not, in fact, maximize the scalar product we consider
because we optimized over vectors having fixed 1-norm
rather than fixed 2-norm. The bound of Eq. (F.3) is
a sufficient condition for joint measurability because it
coincides with the sufficient condition we proved in our
article, namely the inequality of Eq. (F.4),
η ≤ 2
N
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |
, (2)
The equivalence of the two bounds can be established
by noting that
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |2 = N2N , which is
derived with some simple algebra.
For the specific examples of joint measurability that
we considered in Sec. 7 of our article, the bound of (F.3)
is, in fact, necessary and sufficient, so this error does
not affect our analysis of those cases. The necessity of
η ≤ 1√2 (respectively η ≤ 1√3) for the joint measura-
bility of noisy spin observables along a pair (respectively
triple) of orthogonal axes (our proposition 8) is, as we
noted there, proven in Ref. [2]. The necessity of η ≤ 2/3
for the joint measurability of noisy spin observables along
a triple of axes forming a trine (our proposition 10) was
subsequently established by Kunjwal and Ghosh [3] (Ap-
pendix B), which can be seen as a special case of the
necessary condition that they provided in Eq. (B3).
In general, however, explicit counterexamples to the
necessity of the bound can be found. A trivial example 1
arises for spin axes nˆ1 = zˆ, nˆ2 = nˆ3 = −zˆ, for which the
triple of spin observables can be jointly measured even
if they are noiseless, so that the correct bound in this
case is η ≤ 1, while (F.3) implies η ≤ 2/3. Nontrivial
examples can also be found2.
Proposition 11 of our article is also incorrect. It claims
to identify the highest degree of anti-correlation that can
be achieved in a joint measurement of three noisy spin
observables oriented along trine axes with purity param-
eter η = 2/3. But higher degrees of anti-correlation can
in fact be found, implying that our generalized noncon-
textuality inequality, Eq. (113), can in fact be violated
for such measurements, as noted in Refs. [3] and [4].
Our mistake here was a conceptual one. We identified
a POVM that implemented a joint measurement of our
three noisy spin observables and assumed, incorrectly,
that it was the only POVM (up to fine-graining) that
could do so. Such an inference is unproblematic in the
case of projective measurements where if two measure-
ments are jointly implementable then there is a unique
measurement (up to fine-graining) that achieves this,
namely, the one associated to the projectors onto their
joint eigenspaces. In the case of POVMs, however, this
is not the case, as is discussed in detail in Ref. [5].
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In 1960, the mathematician Ernst Specker described a simple example of nonclassical correla-
tions, the counterintuitive features of which he dramatized using a parable about a seer who sets
an impossible prediction task to his daughter’s suitors. We revisit this example here, using it as
an entre´e to three central concepts in quantum foundations: contextuality, Bell-nonlocality, and
complementarity. Specifically, we show that Specker’s parable offers a narrative thread that weaves
together a large number of results, including: the impossibility of measurement-noncontextual and
outcome-deterministic ontological models of quantum theory (the 1967 Kochen-Specker theorem),
in particular the recent state-specific pentagram proof of Klyachko; the impossibility of Bell-local
models of quantum theory (Bell’s theorem), especially the proofs by Mermin and Hardy and ex-
tensions thereof; the impossibility of a preparation-noncontextual ontological model of quantum
theory; and the existence of triples of positive operator valued measures (POVMs) that can be
measured jointly pairwise but not triplewise. Along the way, several novel results are presented,
including: a generalization of a theorem by Fine connecting the existence of a joint distribution
over outcomes of counterfactual measurements to the existence of a measurement-noncontextual
and outcome-deterministic ontological model; a generalization of Klyachko’s proof of the Kochen-
Specker theorem from pentagrams to a family of star polygons; a proof of the Kochen-Specker
theorem in the style of Hardy’s proof of Bell’s theorem (i.e., one that makes use of the failure of
the transitivity of implication for counterfactual statements); a categorization of contextual and
Bell-nonlocal correlations in terms of frustrated networks; a derivation of a new inequality testing
preparation noncontextuality; and lastly, some novel results on the joint measurability of POVMs
and the question of whether these can be modeled noncontextually. Finally, we emphasize that
Specker’s parable of the over-protective seer provides a novel type of foil to quantum theory, chal-
lenging us to explain why the particular sort of contextuality and complementarity embodied therein
does not arise in a quantum world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of quantum foundations, the mathemati-
cian Ernst Specker is rightly famous for introducing, with
co-author Simon Kochen, the concept of a noncontextual
hidden variable model and proving that such a model can-
not underly quantum theory. This 1967 result, known
as the Kochen-Specker theorem [1], continues to be an
active subject of research today (see Ref. [2] for a bibli-
ography). One finds precursors to this result in the 1957
work of Gleason [3] and Bell’s 1966 review article on hid-
den variable models (which refers to Gleason’s result) [4],
but also in a 1960 paper by Specker entitled “The logic of
propositions that are not simultaneously decidable” [5]1.
1 The 1967 Kochen-Specker theorem [1] improves upon many of
these earlier results by making use of a finite set of observables. It
This article studied logical features of quantum theory,
in particular the question of the consistency of counter-
factual propositions concerning the values of observables
that are not comeasurable2. One of the points of the
paper was to show that it is possible to conceive of an
implication relation that is not transitive.
The idea is illustrated with a parable wherein an over-
protective seer sets a simple prediction task to his daugh-
ter’s suitors. The challenge cannot be met because the
seer asks the suitors for a noncontextual assignment of
values but measures a system for which the statistics are
inconsistent with such an assignment. The present ar-
ticle considers the parable anew and seeks to connect
it with modern developments in quantum foundations.
In particular, we explore the extent to which the sorts
of correlations instantiated in the seer’s prediction game
can be achieved in a quantum world. Although the pre-
cise correlations that are required by the seer do not oc-
cur in quantum theory, the prediction game is found to
be a good pump for quantum intuitions. It leads quite
naturally to proofs of nonlocality and contextuality, to
a novel kind of complementarity and to the notion of
stronger-than-quantum correlations. Indeed, it provides
a narrative thread that is able to weave together a great
number of important modern results. That so much can
be gleaned from this little prediction game is a testament
to the depth of Specker’s work. We offer this article as a
small tribute to him on the occasion of his 90th birthday.
A. The parable of the over-protective seer
We begin by reproducing Specker’s parable of the over-
protective seer3, with clarifications by us in square brack-
ets:
At the Assyrian School of Prophets in
Arba’ilu in the time of King Asarhaddon
[(681-669 BCE)], there taught a seer from
Nineva. He was a distinguished representa-
tive of his faculty (eclipses of the sun and
moon) and aside from the heavenly bod-
ies, his interest was almost exclusively in his
daughter. His teaching success was limited;
the subject proved to be dry and required
a previous knowledge of mathematics which
should be noted, however, that Bell’s 1964 proof [6] of quantum
nonlocality is also a proof of contextuality using only a finite
set of observables; unlike the Kochen-Specker proof, it is state-
specific, the first example of this kind.
2 Specker did not use the modern term “counterfactual”, but in-
stead referred to “infuturabilities”, which had been discussed in
a scholastic context in connection with the problem of whether
God’s omniscience extended to knowing the truths of proposi-
tions concerning what would have occurred if some event which
did not happen had in fact happened.
3 Our translation is an amalgam of those provided by Stairs [5]
and Seevinck [7].
3was scarcely available. If he did not find the
student interest which he desired in class, he
did find it elsewhere in overwhelming mea-
sure. His daughter had hardly reached a mar-
riageable age when he was flooded with re-
quests for her hand from students and young
graduates. And though he did not believe
that he would always have her by his side,
she was in any case still too young and her
suitors in no way worthy. In order that the
suitors might convince themselves of their un-
worthiness, he promised them that she would
be wed to the one who could solve a predic-
tion task that was posed to them.
Each suitor was taken before a table on
which three little boxes stood in a row, [each
of which might or might not contain a gem],
and was asked to predict which of the boxes
contained a gem and which did not. But no
matter how many times they tried, it seemed
impossible to succeed in this task. After each
suitor had made his prediction, he was or-
dered by the father to open any two boxes
which he had predicted to be both empty or
any two boxes which he had predicted to be
both full [in accordance with whether he had
predicted there to be at most one gem among
the three boxes, or at least two gems, respec-
tively]. But it always turned out that one
contained a gem and the other one did not,
and furthermore the stone was sometimes in
the first and sometimes in the second of the
boxes that were opened. But how can it be
possible, given three boxes, to neither be able
to pick out two as empty nor two as full?
The daughter would have remained un-
married until the father’s death, if not for
the fact that, after the prediction of the son
of a prophet [whom she fancied], she quickly
opened two boxes herself, one of which had
been indicated to be full and the other empty,
and the suitor’s prediction [for these two
boxes] was found, in this case, to be correct.
Following the weak protest of her father that
he had wanted two other boxes opened, she
tried to open the third. But this proved im-
possible whereupon the father grudgingly ad-
mitted that the prediction, being unfalsified,
was valid. [The daughter and the suitor were
married and lived happily ever after.]
B. Contextuality and Complementarity
Specker’s parable presents us with apparently impossi-
ble correlations; as he says “But how can it be possible,
given three boxes, to neither be able to pick out two
as empty nor two as full?” Indeed, if a suitor reasons
classically, then he expects that even if he chooses a con-
figuration of gems at random from among the eight pos-
sibilities, it will be the true configuration one time out
of eight, and when he opens two boxes he has marked
both empty or both full, his prediction will be found to
be correct one time out of four. The fact that no suitor
manages to succeed after many trials suggests that this
reasoning must be flawed and that whichever two boxes
are opened, one will be found full and the other empty.
Such correlations are contextual in the sense that if one
wishes to explain the measurements (opening a box) as
revealing a pre-existing property, then one must imag-
ine that the outcome of a measurement (or equivalently,
the property that is measured) is context-dependent -
whether a gem is seen or not in the first box depends on
whether that box was opened together with the second
or together with the third. The seer’s challenge cannot
be met by the suitors because he asks them for a non-
contextual assignment of outcomes (i.e. a specification of
whether a gem will be found or not in each box, indepen-
dent of which other box is opened with it) but measures a
system for which the statistics are inconsistent with such
an assignment.4
To imagine a world wherein the parable might occur,
Specker must effectively posit the existence of a system
that exhibits a particular kind of complementarity: the
system must be such that three distinct measurements
can implemented upon it, any pair of which can be mea-
sured jointly, but where a joint measurement of all three
is not possible. To see this, one need only note that if
all three binary-outcome measurements could be imple-
mented jointly, some pair would necessarily be found to
have correlated outcomes.
We now ask the obvious question: Can the parable be
implemented in quantum theory? The reader is urged to
pause and give this question some thought before reading
on.
There is of course a trivial sense in which the para-
ble can be implemented in a quantum world, namely the
same way that it can be implemented in a classical world:
through a hidden mechanism under the seer’s table and
under his control, which inserts and removes gems from
the closed boxes at his will. Such a mechanism would
allow the seer to enforce complementarity and contextu-
ality “by hand”, so to speak. However this is clearly not
what Specker had in mind, because had that been the
case, the seer would not have been so easily stymied by
his daughter’s trick, as there would have been no reason
why the third box could not have been opened. Rather,
the seer seems to be in possession of a set of “magic”
boxes that have particular, rather than arbitrary, corre-
lations. Thus in asking the question whether the parable
4 Because the suitors do not fathom this possibility, they are led to
interpret their consistent failure to provide a correct prediction
as a confirmation of the seer’s assessment of their worth. It is
in this sense that the seer’s task is devised “[i]n order that the
suitors might convince themselves of their unworthiness”.
4can be implemented in quantum theory, we mean: does
quantum theory allow for this sort of “magic”, which
would be truly surprising for a naive suitor familiar only
with classical theories, which do not incorporate contex-
tuality and complementarity at a fundamental level?
Certainly, both complementarity and contextuality are
required at a fundamental level in quantum theory – mea-
surements that cannot be implemented jointly, and cor-
relations that cannot be explained by noncontextual pre-
existing properties (see Ref. [8] for a review). But what
about the particular correlations of the Specker parable?
To get this kind of contextuality, it is necessary to find a
situation wherein there are very specific sorts of limita-
tions on joint measurability — there must exist a triple
of measurements that can only be implemented jointly in
pairs. For projective measurements in quantum theory,
this sort of limitation on joint measurability does not oc-
cur. The reason is as follows. Two Hermitian operators
can be jointly measured if and only they are jointly diag-
onalizable. But if we have three Hermitian operators Aˆ1,
Aˆ2, and Aˆ3, and each pair of operators is jointly diagonal-
izable, then all three are jointly diagonalizable. This is
true for any number of Hermitian operators — one can
implement all jointly if and only if one can implement
every pair jointly.
Nonetheless, one can imagine modifying the parable
in various different ways to obtain something for which
an analogue can be found in quantum theory, and these
different modifications are the topics of the different sec-
tions of our article. In the following we outline each of
them in turn.
C. Outline
We begin by providing, in Sec. II, a formalization of
the original parable as well as some refinements and elab-
orations thereof, together with definitions of the key con-
cepts. We then present the four different themes inspired
by the parable, with an interlude on frustrated networks.
A double-query n-box system allowing only ad-
jacent queries (Sec. III). The seer could have a set
of n boxes, arranged in a ring, for which only adjacent
pairs of boxes can be opened jointly. For n odd, classi-
cal intuition leads one to expect that there must exist at
least one adjacent pair of boxes that are either both full
or both empty, but we can imagine that the seer has a
special system wherein, regardless of which adjacent pair
of boxes is opened, it is always the case that one is found
full and the other empty. The n = 3 case, which corre-
sponds to the original parable, is exceptional because the
adjacent pairs constitute all the pairs. For n > 3, this
is not the case, and so there is no longer any obstacle to
finding a set of projective measurements that have the
same pattern of joint measurability as these boxes. In-
deed, one can find such sets. There are then two ways of
trying to obtain a quantum analogue of the new parable.
i) Klyachko’s proof of contextuality. Find a quantum
state that yields a nonzero probability of anti-correlation
for every adjacent pair. When the overall probability is
higher than one could account for classically, we arrive
at a Klyachko-type proof of quantum contextuality [9].
ii) A new variant of Klyachko’s proof of contextuality.
Find a quantum state that supports the implication from
one outcome to the opposite outcome for every adjacent
pair in the ring and that assigns a non-zero probability
to the first outcome in the sequence of inferences. In
conjunction with the transitivity of implication (a conse-
quence of noncontextuality), and the fact that the ring
contains an odd number of boxes, this gives rise to a
contradiction, thereby demonstrating the contextuality
of quantum theory.
A separated pair of single-query 3-box systems
(Sec. IV). One can imagine that the seer’s three-box
system is such that only a single box (rather than a pair
of boxes) can be opened at any given time, but that it
is possible to prepare a pair of three-box systems such
that by opening a single box on each element of the pair,
one reproduces the seer’s correlations. Specifically, if the
same box is opened on each member of the pair, they
are always found to be both full or both empty, while
if different boxes are opened on the two systems, one is
always found full and the other empty. (Classically, one
would expect that some pair of boxes on a given wing
are both full or both empty, and by the assumed perfect
correlation between the wings, the same pair is similarly
configured on the other wing, implying that it is impossi-
ble to open different boxes on the two systems and always
find anti-correlation rather than correlation.) Here, we
are postulating six distinct measurements (three on each
wing) only certain pairs of which can be implemented
jointly, namely, pairs that have one member from each
wing. So again, there is no obstacle to finding a set of pro-
jectors having this pattern of joint measurability. There
are once again two ways of trying to obtain a quantum
analogue of the new parable.
i)Mermin’s proof of Bell-nonlocality. Find a quantum
state that yields perfect correlation when the same mea-
surement is implemented on the two wings. Demonstrate
that the extent to which it can yield anti-correlation when
different boxes are opened is greater than is possible in a
Bell-local model [10].
ii) Hardy’s proof of Bell-nonlocality. Find a chain
of choices of measurement, alternating between the two
parties, and find a quantum state that yields implica-
tions connecting particular outcomes of all but one mea-
surement within this chain. Demonstrate that there is a
nonzero probability for the kind of correlation exhibited
by the last pair in the chain to be opposite to what one
would expect by the transitivity of implication [11].
We also consider generalizations of these nonlocality
proofs to rings of n measurements where only adjacent
members can be implemented jointly.
Interlude on frustrated networks (Sec. V). By
representing correlations between binary-valued observ-
ables by frustrated networks, we provide a simple cat-
5egorization of some of the contextual and Bell-nonlocal
correlations outlined above.
A diachronic pair of single-queries of a 3-box
system (Sec. VI). In this case, the seer’s three-box sys-
tem is modified so that only a single box can be opened
at any given time, but that it is possible to implement
two consecutive measurements in such a way that if the
same box is opened at the two times, then the result of
the measurement is always reproduced faithfully, while
if different boxes are opened at the two times, then the
results are always different. In addition, we impose the
constraint that no measurement at the second time can
yield any information about the choice of the measure-
ment at the first time.
Now it is natural for a suitor to assume that sta-
tistical indistinguishability among a set of choices im-
plies that they are equivalent at the level of an onto-
logical model. This assumption is known as prepara-
tion noncontextuality [12]. It can be shown that no such
preparation-noncontextual model can reproduce the di-
achronic (two-time) correlations stated above. But in
quantum mechanics (which violates preparation noncon-
textuality [12]), there are sets of measurements for which
these correlations can be approximated even though the
quantum state after the first measurement reveals no in-
formation about the identity of this measurement.
Joint measurability of POVMs (Sec. VII). A fi-
nal path to a quantum analogue of the overprotective
seer (OS) parable is to ignore the counter-intuitive corre-
lations, and rather concentrate on the complementarity
exhibited by the three boxes. As discussed above, the
pairwise but not triplewise joint measurability of three
observables cannot exist in quantum mechanics for tra-
ditional (projective) measurements. However, this does
not rule out the possibility that there exists a triple of
generalized measurements, described by POVMs (posi-
tive operator valued measures), that can be jointly mea-
sured pairwise but not triplewise. Indeed, we will exhibit
two specific examples of such a triple of nonprojective
measurements. This thread connects with some recent
results on joint measurability of POVMs [13–16]. We
demonstrate that this example is not useful for approxi-
mating the OS correlations, nor for proving the contex-
tuality of quantum theory.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND A FORMALIZATION
OF THE PARABLE
A. Joint measurability
We wish to flesh out the original parable by being
more specific about the nature of the correlations posited
therein. We shall do this within the context of oper-
ational theories. This is natural because the OS para-
ble was originally presented by Specker as a “toy the-
ory” with similarities to quantum theory, not as a sce-
nario that arises within quantum theory. We thus need a
unified framework to compare the OS theory both with
quantum theory, and with classical theories (i.e. theo-
ries without contextuality or complementarity). Also, to
make the most of the OS parable we need to embellish the
narrative (in a formal way) by adding extra assumptions,
and this requires considering measurements and prepa-
rations beyond those discussed by Specker. Finally, we
note that in the fields of quantum foundations and quan-
tum information, there is currently considerable interest
in operational “foil” theories such as Popescu-Rohrlich
(PR) boxes [17] and the toy-bit theory [18].
An operational theory is one that specifies the prob-
abilities of each possible outcome X of each possible
measurement procedure M given each possible prepa-
ration procedure P . We denote these probabilities by
p(X |M ;P ). It will be important for the later discussion
of contextuality to distinguish between a measurement
procedure M , which is a specification of a list of instruc-
tions of what to do in the laboratory, and an equivalence
class M of measurement procedures, where two proce-
dures are equivalent if they yield the same statistics for
all preparation procedures. For instance, the equivalence
class associated with a particular measurement procedure
M1 is
M1≡{M | ∀P : p(X |M ;P ) = p(X |M1;P )} . (1)
We will refer to this equivalence relation over procedures
as operational equivalence. We will refer to the equiva-
lence classes as simply measurements, and denote them
by calligraphic font, while the measurement procedures
will be denoted by italic font. Similarly, we define equiv-
alence classes of preparation procedures. For instance,
the equivalence class associated with a particular prepa-
ration procedure P1 is
P1≡{P | ∀M : p(X |M ;P ) = p(X |M ;P1)} . (2)
Given that probabilities of outcomes of measurements
depend only on the equivalence classes of the preparation
and the measurement procedures, we typically condition
only on the latter and write p(X |M;P).
We begin by providing an operational definition of joint
measurability5. We consider only measurements with a
discrete set of outcomes.
Joint measurability of a set of N measurements can be
defined (recursively) as follows.
Definition 1 (joint measurability). A set of N measure-
ments {M1,M2, ...,MN} is jointly measurable if there
exists a measurement M with the following features: (i)
The outcome set of M is the Cartesian product of the
outcome sets of {M1,M2, ...,MN} and (ii) the out-
come distributions for every joint measurement of a sub-
set {Ms|s ∈ S} ⊂ {M1,M2, ...,MN} are recovered as
5 This definition is a generalization of the notion of coexistence of
quantum observables provided in Ref. [13].
6marginals of the outcome distribution ofM for all prepa-
rations P. Denoting a joint measurement of the subset S
by MS, and its outcome by XS,
MS ≡ {Ms|s ∈ S} , XS ≡ {Xs|s ∈ S} (3)
the condition can be expressed as
∀S, ∀P : p (XS |MS ;P) =
∑
Xt:t/∈S
p (X1, X2, ..., XN |M;P) .
(4)
Definition 2 (n-tuple-wise joint measurability). A set of
measurements {M1,M2, ...,MN} is n-tuple-wise jointly
measurable if every n-element subset (i.e. every n-tuple
of measurements) is jointly measurable.
Clearly joint measurability of all n-tuples implies joint
measurability of all (n− 1)-tuples, but not vice-versa.
Finally, we shall sometimes say that the measurements
in a set {M1,M2, ...,MN} exhibit complementary if
they are not jointly measurable.
We can now be precise about the nature of the corre-
lations in the overprotective seer’s prediction game.
Abstracting from the story of boxes and gems, the
parable posits that there are three distinct measurement
procedures, which we shall denote by M1, M2 and M3
(corresponding to the choice of box). A key assumption
that is not explicit in Specker’s description of the predic-
tion game is that these three measurement procedures
are not operationally equivalent. That is, for every pair,
there is a preparation procedure that distinguishes them,
that is, some P such that p(X |M1;P ) 6= p(X |M2;P ).
Making this assumption, we see that the game assumes
the existence of three distinct equivalence classes of mea-
surement procedures, which we denote by M1, M2 and
M3. Furthermore, it is assumed that these are pairwise
jointly measurable. It follows that there exist three joint
measurements, which we shall denote byM12, M13 and
M23 and which, by virtue of the definition of joint mea-
surability, must have statistics that reproduce the statis-
tics ofM1,M2 andM3 as marginals. Note that, as the
notation suggests, M12, M13 and M23 correspond to
distinct equivalence classes of measurement procedures,
a fact that follows from the operational distinguishability
of M1, M2 and M3.
Note also that within the equivalence class of measure-
ment proceduresM1, there are proceduresM (2)1 that in-
volve implementing a joint measurement ofM1 andM2
and discarding the outcome of theM2 measurement, and
there are procedures M
(3)
1 that involve implementing a
joint measurement of M1 and M3 and discarding the
outcome of the M3 measurement. Which of these two
procedures is implemented may be relevant in a contex-
tual hidden variable model, as we will see.
The seer’s trick also requires that there is at least one
preparation, call it P∗, that yields perfect negative corre-
lations for the joint measurement of any pair ofM1,M2
and M3. Perfect negative correlation for a single joint
measurement of M1 and M2 does not imply that one
must have equal probability for X1 = 0, X2 = 1 and
X1 = 1, X2 = 0 (the two ways of achieving perfect nega-
tive correlation). However, this equality does follow from
demanding perfect negative correlation for all three joint
measurements, as we show in Appendix A. Consequently,
the correlations are of the form
∀i 6= j :p(Xi = 0, Xj = 1|Mi,j ;P∗) = 1
2
p(Xi = 1, Xj = 0|Mi,j ;P∗) = 1
2
(5)
We call these the overprotective seer correlations, or OS
correlations. Note that it follows from this definition that
individual measurements have a uniformly random out-
come,
p(Xi = 0|Mi;P∗) = p(Xi = 1|Mi;P∗) = 1
2
. (6)
B. The existence of a joint distribution
The question of joint measurability concerns what is
physically possible, not what is logically possible. If a
physical theory postulates measurements that cannot be
jointly implemented, it could still be that there is a joint
probability distribution over the outcomes of these mea-
surements that yields each measurement’s statistics as a
marginal.
Definition 3 (existence of a joint distribution). Con-
sider a set of measurements {M1,M2, ...,MN} . Let S
be a subset of their indices and denote the joint measure-
ment associated with this subset by MS and its outcome
by XS, as in Eq. (3). A joint distribution for the mea-
surements {M1,M2, ...,MN} is said to exist if there ex-
ists a distribution p (X1...XN |P) for every preparation P
such that for any measurement MS ,
p (XS |MS ;P) =
∑
Xν :ν /∈S
p(X1...XN |P). (7)
It is worth noting that within a given theory, the
nonexistence of a joint distribution for some set of mea-
surements implies the physical impossibility of a joint
measurement of these. This follows from the fact that if
a joint measurement is possible, then there must exist a
joint distribution over the outcomes. However, the con-
verse implication need not hold. For instance, there are
theories, such as the toy theory of Ref. [18] which postu-
late the physical impossibility of certain joint measure-
ments, but for which a joint distribution over outcomes
(effectively a hidden variable model) does exist.
The feature of the OS correlations that is at the root
of their peculiarities is the fact that they do not admit
of a joint distribution.
Lemma 4 (no joint distribution for OS correlations).
There is no distribution p(X1, X2, X3) on the three binary
7variables X1, X2 and X3 such that the marginals over
pairs of these are of the form of Eq. (5).
Proof. There are eight valuations of (X1, X2, X3), of
the form (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), . . . But whichever
of these valuations is assigned non-zero probability in
p(X1, X2, X3), one of the three pairs (X1, X2), (X1, X3)
or (X2, X3) will have non-zero probability assigned either
to the valuation (0, 0), “both boxes empty”, or to the
valuation (1, 1) “both boxes full”. For this pair, either
p(0, 0) > 0 or p(1, 1) > 0, so that perfect anti-correlation
is not achieved.
Given the discussion above, this result has immediate
(negative) consequences for the possibility of implement-
ing a triplewise joint measurement of M1, M2 andM3.
Corollary 5. Measurements M1, M2 and M3 that can
be pairwise jointly measured and that achieve the OS cor-
relations of Eq. (5) cannot be triplewise jointly measured.
C. Measurement-noncontextual ontological models
In this article, we will make use of the generalized no-
tion of noncontextuality introduced in Ref. [12], which is
operational insofar as it is defined for ontological mod-
els of any operational theory, not just quantum theory.
An ontological model of an operational theory specifies:
(i) a set Λ of ontic (i.e. real, physical) states λ; (ii)
for each preparation procedure P , a distribution p(λ|P )
describing the probability that the ontic state of the sys-
tem subsequent to the preparation procedure P is λ; (iii)
for each measurement procedure M , a response function
p(X |M ;λ) describing the conditional probability of ob-
taining outcome X given ontic state λ. Finally, one must
recover the statistics of the operational theory as follows:
p(X |M ;P ) =
∑
λ
p(X |M ;λ)p(λ|P ). (8)
Here we have taken λ to be a discrete variable for sim-
plicity.
An ontological model is said to be measurement-
noncontextual if any two measurement procedures that
are operationally equivalent [in the sense of Eq. (1)] are
represented similarly in the model:
∀P : p(X |M ;P ) = p(X |M ′;P )
⇒ ∀λ : p(X |M ;λ) = p(X |M ′;λ). (9)
Equivalently, the condition is that the response function
for a measurement procedure M depends only on its op-
erational equivalence class M, that is,
p(X |M ;λ) = p(X |M;λ). (10)
An ontological model is said to be outcome-
deterministic for a measurement procedureM if the out-
come is uniquely determined for every ontic state,
∀λ ∈ Λ : p(X |M ;λ) ∈ {0, 1}. (11)
The traditional notion of a noncontextual ontological
model of quantum theory incorporated both the assump-
tion of measurement noncontextuality and that of out-
come determinism for projective measurements. Here,
we will follow Ref. [12] and distinguish these assump-
tions so as not to conflate issues about determinism with
issues about noncontextuality. To avoid terminological
confusion, we shall say that an ontological model of quan-
tum theory is traditionally-noncontextual if it is both
measurement-noncontextual [in the sense of Eq. (9)] and
outcome-deterministic for projective measurements. Any
proof of the impossibility of a traditionally-noncontextual
model of quantum theory will be called a proof of the
Kochen-Specker theorem.
As it turns out, there is a close connection between the
existence of a joint distribution and noncontextuality:
Theorem 6. For a given set of measurements, if
there exists a measurement-noncontextual and outcome-
deterministic ontological model then there exists a joint
distribution for their outcomes.
The proof is provided in Appendix B. This is a slight
generalization of half of a theorem by Fine [19]. Combin-
ing this theorem with the nonexistence of a joint distri-
bution for the OS correlations (lemma 4), we have:
Corollary 7. There is no measurement-noncontextual
and outcome-deterministic ontological model of the OS
correlations of Eq. (5).
It is also possible to write down inequalities which must
be satisfied by the experimental statistics if these are
to admit of an explanation in terms of a measurement-
noncontextual and outcome-deterministic model. We
will call these Kochen-Specker inequalities. For the case
of the OS correlations, if we imagine such a model
then each box must be either empty or full. Conse-
quently, if we choose a pair of boxes uniformly at ran-
dom at most two of the three pairs could exhibit anti-
correlation, so that the probability of obtaining anti-
correlated outcomes is bounded above by 2/3. More pre-
cisely, if p (Xi 6= Xi⊕1|Mi,i⊕1;P) denotes the probability
of obtaining anti-correlated outcomes in a joint measure-
ment ofMi andMi⊕1, where⊕ denotes addition modulo
3, then the average probability of success is
R3 ≡
3∑
i=1
1
3
p (Xi 6= Xi⊕1|Mi,i⊕1;P) , (12)
and it satisfies
R3 ≤ RNC3 =
2
3
. (13)
This is a Kochen-Specker inequality.
It is sometimes useful to express Kochen-Specker in-
equalities in an algebraic form. We define new variables
X¯i = (−1)Xi , so that X¯i = +1(−1) when Xi = 0(1).
8Using angle brackets to denote averages, we consider the
following combination of correlation functions
S3 ≡
〈
X¯1X¯2
〉
+
〈
X¯2X¯3
〉
+
〈
X¯3X¯1
〉
. (14)
Then the inequality takes the form
S3 ≥ SNC3 = −1, (15)
The OS correlations, however, require
〈
X¯iX¯i⊕1
〉
= −1
for all i and hence S3 = −3, clearly violating the bound.
With the correlations in this form, one can also express
a proof of the impossibility of an outcome-deterministic
noncontextual model in the algebraic manner introduced
by Mermin [20]. Assuming that X¯i ∈ {+1,−1} has a
value independent of context, the OS correlations require
that these values satisfy the following algebraic relations.
X¯1X¯2 = −1, (16)
X¯1X¯3 = −1,
X¯2X¯3 = −1.
However, these relations cannot be satisfied because the
product of the left-hand-sides is X¯21X¯
2
2 X¯
2
3 = +1, while
the product of the right-hand-sides is −1.
Any theory that realizes the OS correlations fails to
admit of a measurement-noncontextual and outcome-
deterministic ontological model. However, as explained
in the introduction, the kind of complementarity one re-
quires to achieve these correlations – three measurements
that are pairwise but not triplewise jointly measurable
— cannot arise for projective measurements in quantum
theory. In Sec. III, we turn to the modifications of the
parable that do have a counterpart in quantum theory.
D. Preparation noncontextuality
The notion of measurement noncontextuality defined
in Eq. (9) is motivated by a kind of equivalence principle:
in the absence of observable differences between measure-
ment procedures (i.e. differences in their statistics) one
should not posit differences in their representations in
the ontological model. In Ref. [12] it was argued that the
same principle should lead one to an assumption of non-
contextuality for preparation procedures. Specifically, an
ontological model is said to be preparation noncontextual
if any two preparation procedures that are operationally
equivalent [in the sense of Eq. (2)] are represented equiv-
alently in the model:
∀M : p(X |M ;P ) = p(X |M ;P ′)
⇒ ∀λ : p(λ|P ) = p(λ|P ′). (17)
Preparation noncontextuality can also be characterized
as the condition that the distribution for a preparation
procedure P depends only on its operational equivalence
class P , that is,
p(λ|P ) = p(λ|P). (18)
Given their similar motivations, someone who en-
dorses measurement noncontextuality ought also to en-
dorse preparation noncontextuality just as enthusiasti-
cally. One should endorse both notions or neither. There-
fore, it is most natural to ask about the possibility of an
ontological model that is both preparation-noncontextual
and measurement-noncontextual. We will call such mod-
els generalized-noncontextual 6. In this paper, we will
consider suitors faced with the seer’s prediction problem
who are committed to the kind of equivalence principle
described above and therefore to generalized noncontex-
tuality.
Inequalities that must be satisfied by the experimen-
tal statistics if these are to admit of a generalized-
noncontextual model will be called simply noncontextual-
ity inequalities. Note that our terminology distinguishes
such inequalities from the Kochen-Specker inequalities
of the previous section: Kochen-Specker inequalities ex-
press constraints on statistics when one assumes outcome
determinism in addition to measurement noncontextual-
ity, while noncontextuality inequalities rely on no such
assumption of determinism. An example of a noncontex-
tuality inequality will be provided in Sec. VI.
E. Justifying outcome determinism
Note that a commitment to the kind of equivalence
principle described above does not obviously provide any
grounds for assuming outcome determinism for measure-
ments, Eq. (11). Thus, faced with the OS correlations
and corollary 7, a suitor might simply deny outcome de-
terminism to salvage measurement noncontextuality. For
instance, seeing the correlations in the seer’s prediction
game, a clever suitor might hypothesize that they are
explained by the following sort of model. There is an
ontic variable that flags when the preparation P∗ was
implemented and if it was, the measurementsM12,M13
and M23 each generate the outcomes (0, 1) and (1, 0)
uniformly at random. Such an ontological model would
violate outcome determinism, but would preserve mea-
surement noncontextuality.
On the other hand, the assumption of outcome de-
terminism can sometimes be shown to be a consequence
of preparation noncontextuality. If such a justification
is forthcoming, then the OS correlations cannot be ex-
plained by any ontological model that is generalized-
noncontextual. For instance, in quantum theory, the
assumption of outcome determinism for projective mea-
surements can be derived from preparation noncontex-
tuality, as shown in Ref. [12]. Therefore, in quantum
theory the conjunction of measurement noncontextuality
and outcome determinism for projective measurements
— i.e. the assumption of traditional noncontextuality
6 In Ref [12], these were called “universally noncontextual.”
9of an ontological model — is implied by the assumption
of generalized noncontextuality and all the no-go theo-
rems for the former are no-go theorems for the latter.
In Sec. III, we will provide proofs of the failure of tradi-
tional noncontextuality in quantum theory using a gen-
eralization of the OS correlations. Given the result just
mentioned, such proofs also demonstrate the failure of
generalized noncontextuality.
Much of this article makes statements about correla-
tions that are not found in quantum theory but can easily
be imagined to occur in more general operational theo-
ries. In such theories, a natural analogue of the notion
of a projective measurement can be defined. The ques-
tion thus arises of whether the assumption of preparation
noncontextuality might imply outcome determinism for
such measurements for an ontological model of a general
operational theory. The question is currently open, but
we conjecture that it has a positive answer.
Fortunately, we can still draw some negative conclu-
sions about generalized noncontextuality in operational
theories without settling this conjecture. Specifically, in
Sec. VI, we will demonstrate how a slight modification of
the seer’s game yields a set of correlations that fails to
admit of a preparation-noncontextual ontological model.
III. NO-GO THEOREMS FOR
MEASUREMENT-NONCONTEXTUAL AND
OUTCOME-DETERMINISTIC MODELS
A. A double-query n-box system allowing only
adjacent queries
One way to generalize Specker’s parable is to consider
n > 3 boxes, and allow only certain pairs to be opened
jointly. In particular, one can imagine the boxes to be
arranged in a ring with adjacent pairs being the only
ones that can be opened jointly. The resulting pattern of
joint measurability can be reproduced in quantum the-
ory because there exist ordered sets of n > 3 projectors
for which adjacent elements commute (where adjacency
is determined modulo n). If n is odd, then for every
deterministic and noncontextual assignment of gems to
boxes that the suitor might make, there must exist at
least one adjacent pair of boxes that are either both full
or both empty. Indeed, given any assignment of gems to
boxes, if we choose an adjacent pair of boxes uniformly at
random, the probability of obtaining anti-correlated out-
comes is bounded above by (n− 1)/n. We then imagine
that the seer has a special system such that, regardless
of which adjacent pair of boxes is opened, it is always the
case that one is found full and the other empty. 7 For
these correlations, unlike those described in the original
7 Note that for even n, one cannot develop an interesting para-
ble because there are assignments of gems to boxes wherein no
adjacent pair is both full or both empty.
parable, one can find a quantum analogue. Although
this analogue does not allow the seer to always defeat
the suitor’s prediction, the probability of finding perfect
anti-correlation between a pair of adjacent boxes can be
greater than the success rate of (n − 1)/n expected by
classical reasoning.
Let us consider this situation more carefully. We
are imagining an odd number n ≥ 5 of measurements,
{Ma|a = 1, ..., n}, such that for all a, Ma and Ma⊕1
are jointly measurable by a measurement Ma,a⊕1 (here
⊕ denotes addition modulo n), and that there is at least
one preparation, call it P∗, such that the outcomes of all
of these pairs of measurements are anti-correlated. By a
generalization of the argument provided in Appendix A,
the correlations must be of the form
∀ a :p(Xa = 0, Xa⊕1 = 1|Ma,a⊕1;P∗) = 1
2
p(Xa = 1, Xa⊕1 = 0|Ma,a⊕1;P∗) = 1
2
. (19)
We will call these the double-query n-box OS correlations.
By an argument analogous to the one proving lemma
4 one can show that there is no joint distribution
over all the Xa that reproduces these correlations as
marginals. It then follows from theorem 6 that there is no
measurement-noncontextual and outcome-deterministic
ontological model of these correlations.
Indeed, if we choose an adjacent pair of boxes uni-
formly at random, the probability Rn of obtaining anti-
correlated outcomes,
Rn ≡
n∑
a=1
1
n
p (Xa 6= Xa⊕1|Ma,Ma⊕1;P) , (20)
is clearly bounded above,
Rn ≤ 1− 1
n
(21)
(because at most n − 1 pairs can be anti-correlated if n
is odd). The double-query n-box OS correlations yield
Rn = 1, maximally violating this Kochen-Specker in-
equality.
We may equivalently state the restriction as follows.
Following the convention established in Sec. II C, we de-
fine X¯a = (−1)Xa ∈ {+1,−1}. For all measurement-
noncontextual and deterministic assignments of the value
X¯a, at most n − 1 of the pair-wise products can be −1,
so that:
Sn ≡
〈
X¯1X¯2
〉
+
〈
X¯2X¯3
〉
+· · ·+〈X¯nX¯1〉 ≥ −(n−2), (22)
whereas the double-query n-box OS correlations give
Sn = −n.
Again, a simple algebraic way of manifesting the
fact that the double-query n-box correlations do not
admit of a measurement-noncontextual and outcome-
deterministic model is that they require X¯a ∈ {+1,−1}
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such that
X¯1X¯2 = −1,
X¯2X¯3 = −1,
...
X¯n−1X¯n = −1,
X¯nX¯1 = −1, (23)
but the product of the left-hand-sides is X¯21X¯
2
2 · · · X¯2n =
+1, while the product of the right-hand-sides is −1.
We now consider what values of Rn and Sn can be
achieved in quantum theory.
B. Klyachko’s proof of the Kochen-Specker
theorem
We require n Hermitian observables Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn —
each having eigenvalues 0 and 1 — associated with the
n measurements M1, . . . ,Mn. As discussed in Sec. IB,
for the specific case of n = 3, the pairwise commutativity
of Xˆ1, Xˆ2 and Xˆ3 implies their triplewise commutativ-
ity and consequently the existence of a triplewise joint
measurement and of a measurement-noncontextual and
outcome-deterministic model.8
Nonetheless, we can obtain something interesting for
odd n greater than 3. We begin with the case of n = 5.
A no-go theorem of this sort has recently been given by
Klyachko [21] (see also Refs. [9] and [22]). The con-
struction is as follows. We consider a quantum system
described by a 3-dimensional Hilbert space, and all of
the states we consider require only real-valued coefficients
in some basis. Thus the system can be visualized in 3-
dimensional Euclidean space. The observables are pro-
jectors Xˆa = |la〉〈la|, where the vectors {|la〉 : a = 1, ..., 5}
are of the form
|la〉 = (sin θ cosϕa, sin θ sinϕa, cos θ), (24)
and ϕa =
4pia
5 so that the sequence of vectors forms a
pentagram, as in Fig. 1. The angle θ is chosen such
that vectors adjacent in the sequence are orthogonal,
〈la|la⊕1〉 = 0, where ⊕ denotes sum modulo 5. As a
result of this orthogonality relation, adjacent observables
Xˆa, Xˆa⊕1 are indeed jointly measurable. It is clear that
such a value of θ exists because as it varies from 0 to pi2 ,
the angle between adjacent vectors varies from 0 to 4pi5 .
In fact, orthogonality is achieved at cos θ = 14√5 .
Now consider a preparation of the quantum state |ψ1〉
corresponding to the vector lying along the symmetry
8 Another way to see that the Kochen-Specker inequality (15) can-
not be violated in quantum theory is that we can treat S3 as a
polynomial of commuting variables, and thus its minimum can
be attained by assigning the value to each variable in a noncon-
textual and deterministic manner.
FIG. 1. Quantum states and observables used for Klyachko’s
proof of contextuality and the proof of contextuality via the
failure of transitivity of implication.
axis of the pentagram, such that the angle between it and
each of the |la〉 is θ. In a measurement of any adjacent
pair of observables Xˆa, Xˆa⊕1, either just one of them
yields the outcome 1, in which case the outcomes are anti-
correlated, or both yield the outcome 0. The probability
for anti-correlation is 2 cos2(θ) = 2/
√
5, which implies
that the Kochen-Specker bound of Eq. (21) is violated,
R5 = R
quantum
5 =
2√
5
≃ 0.89442  4
5
. (25)
Equivalently, with the observables X¯a = 2Xˆa − 1ˆ, where
1ˆ is the identity operator, the state |ψ1〉 achieves S5 =
5− 4√5 ≈ −3.9443 6≥ −3.
The value 2/
√
5 is in fact the maximum possible quan-
tum violation of this Kochen-Specker inequality. We
show this in Appendix C with the help from the converg-
ing hierarchy of semidefinite programming (SDP) tools
discussed in Ref. [23] [see also Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) be-
low].
Note that unlike the no-coloring proofs of the Kochen-
Specker theorem, this is a state-specific proof [24, 25].9
In fact, for 3-dimensional quantum state, this is a state-
specific proof that involves the smallest set of vectors
{|la〉} satisfying the orthogonality relation 〈la|la⊕1〉 =
0 [9].10
9 Note also that the claim in Klyachko et al. [9] that the inequality
in question provides a “test of arbitrary hidden variables model,
context free or not” is mistaken. If the values assigned to ob-
servables could be context-dependent, there would be no contra-
diction.
10 The 2-vector and 3-vector cases are trivial. For the 4-vector case,
note that the orthogonality relation 〈la|la⊕1〉 = 0 implies that
some pair of non-adjacent vectors must be collinear which, in
turn, implies that all the four projectors |la〉〈la| must commute,
and therefore cannot violate any Kochen-Specker inequality.
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1. Generalization to all odd n.
One can generalize Klyachko’s no-go result to all odd
n as follows. Define n observables by the projectors onto
vectors {|la〉 : a = 1, ..., n} defined as in Eq. (24) but with
ϕa =
n−1
n πa and with θ chosen such that 〈la|la⊕1〉 = 0,
where ⊕ denotes sum modulo n. This is achieved when
cos2 θ = cos(π/n)/(1 + cos(π/n)). This set of n vectors
forms what is known as an {n/n−12 } star polygon [26].
The {5/2}, {7/3} and {9/4} star polygons are depicted in
Fig. 2. Again, preparing the quantum state on the sym-
metry axis of the star polygon, the probability of anti-
correlation for adjacent observables violates the Kochen-
Specker bound of Eq. (21) with
Rn = R
quantum
n =
2 cos(pin )
1 + cos(pin )
 1− 1
n
(26)
or equivalently, the Kochen-Specker bound of Eq. (22)
with
Sn = Squantumn = n− 2nRquantumn
= n− 4n cos(
pi
n )
1 + cos(pin )
 2− n. (27)
As with the n = 5 case, these values also represent the
strongest possible quantum violation of these Kochen-
Specker inequalities, as is shown in Appendix C. At large
n, the quantum probability approaches unity quadrati-
cally as
Rquantumn ≃ 1−
π2
4n2
, (28)
in contrast to the linear approach to unity of the Kochen-
Specker bound.
FIG. 2. {n/n−1
2
} star polygons for n = 5, 7, and 9.
It is worth emphasizing that by using the quantum cor-
relations for n measurements, the seer can achieve some-
thing very close to the ends he achieved in the original
parable. Specifically, the seer can construct a prediction
game such that suitors who reason classically think the
game is fair (i.e. they think it is highly likely that some
suitor will win) when in fact it is not (because classical
reasoning does not apply and it is actually highly unlikely
that any suitor will win).
The prediction game that meets the seer’s ends is as
follows. The suitor is asked to pick an adjacent pair of
boxes that he believes to be both empty or both full and
to open those. If his prediction for those two boxes is cor-
rect, the suitor wins, otherwise he loses. With what prob-
ability will a suitor who reasons classically expect to win?
We presume that he knows the seer to be adversarial and
so he reasons that the seer has prepared a classical con-
figuration which makes his [the suitor’s] task as difficult
as possible. He reasons therefore that the configuration
is one wherein only one adjacent pair of boxes is both
full or both empty (by his classical lights, he knows that
there must be at least one such pair for an odd number
of boxes). Thus the suitor expects his probability of win-
ning to be the probability that he has guessed correctly
which of all the n pairs is the correlated one, times the
probability that he has guessed their contents correctly –
overall, a probability of 1/2n. In fact, the probability of
the suitor’s prediction coming true is only of order 1/n2
in the quantum scheme described above. Let us say the
number of suitors is l, assumed large. Then if the seer
chooses the number of boxes n such that n ≪ l ≪ n2,
the suitors believe it to be very likely that one of them
will win when in fact it is very likely that none of them
will win.
C. A proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem based
on the failure of transitivity of implication
Specker’s intent in introducing his parable was to
demonstrate the logical possibility of a failure of the tran-
sitivity of implication. The idea is straightforward. Sup-
pose s1, s2 and s3 are propositions that assert the pres-
ence of a gem in boxes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and ¬s1,
¬s2 and ¬s3 assert their negations. We have s1 =⇒ ¬s2
(because boxes 1 and 2 are never found both full), and
¬s2 =⇒ s3 (because boxes 2 and 3 are never found both
empty). If implication were transitive, then we could con-
clude that s1 =⇒ s3. But in fact we have s1 =⇒ ¬s3
(because boxes 1 and 3 are never found both full). There-
fore, assuming a gem is sometimes found in box 1, tran-
sitivity fails.
Specker’s 1960 article was framed within the tradition
of quantum logic, and although some researchers have
proposed that quantum theory might require us to aban-
don some of the rules of classical logic as rules of right-
reasoning (see, for example, Ref. [27]), we will not con-
sider this possibility here. Indeed, if we incorporate the
context of a measurement in the propositions, so that we
distinguish s1, finding a gem in box 1 in the context of
measuring box 1 with box 2, from s′1, finding a gem in
box 1 in the context of measuring box 1 with box 3, then
the transitivity of implication can be salvaged and there
is no challenge to classical logic.
Nonetheless, the failure of the transitivity of implica-
tion provides another perspective on how to generate
no-go results for measurement-noncontextual outcome-
deterministic models. In such models, implications
among value assignments of observables are necessarily
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transitive because these value assignments do not depend
on the context of the measurement. A failure of the tran-
sitivity of implication therefore implies the impossibility
of such a model.
In the case of the double-query n-box OS correlations,
if n is odd, the perfect anti-correlations justify the fol-
lowing implications around the ring of boxes,
X1 = 1 =⇒ X2 = 0 =⇒ X3 = 1 (29)
=⇒ ... =⇒ Xn = 1 =⇒ X1 = 0.
By the transitivity of implication, we would conclude
that X1 = 1 =⇒ X1 = 0. Given that X1 = 1 is
sometimes observed, one has a contradiction. Conse-
quently, the observation of the double-query n-box OS
correlations implies the impossibility of a measurement-
noncontextual outcome-deterministic ontological model.
We now demonstrate the existence of a quantum ana-
logue of this argument in the case of n = 5. Specifically,
we demonstrate that for the set of observables in Kly-
achko’s proof, specified in Eq. (24) and depicted in Fig. 1,
there is a quantum state such that
X1 = 1 =⇒ X2 = 0 =⇒ X3 = 1 (30)
=⇒ X4 = 0 =⇒ X5 = 1 =⇒ X1 = 0.
First, note that an inference from Xa = 1 to Xa⊕1 = 0
can be made independently of the quantum state, be-
cause for any pair of orthogonal projectors, at most one
of them can take the value 1. However, an inference from
Xa = 0 to Xa⊕1 = 1 is only true for certain quantum
states because a pair of projectors may both be assigned
the value 0. To ensure that Xa = 0 implies Xa⊕1 = 1,
we must choose a quantum state that lies in the span of
the vectors |la〉 and |la⊕1〉 in Hilbert space. This way, the
vector orthogonal to this span is assigned value 0, such
that if |la〉 is assigned value 0, |la⊕1〉 must be assigned
the value 1. Starting with an assignment of X1 = 1, we
need to make the Xa = 0 to Xa⊕1 = 1 inference twice
in the pentagram: from X2 = 0 to X3 = 1 and from
X4 = 0 to X5 = 1. Consequently, we need a quantum
state that lies in the subspace (plane) spanned by |l2〉
and |l3〉 but also in the subspace spanned by |l4〉 and
|l5〉. Fortunately, these subspaces intersect on a ray (see
Fig. 1), and therefore we take the quantum state to be
the one associated with that ray, indicated in Fig. 1 as
|ψ2〉.
Therefore, assuming a preparation of the state |ψ2〉,
we have the sequence of implications of Eq. (30). By the
transitivity of implication, we can conclude that X1 =
1 =⇒ X1 = 0. Given that X1 = 1 is assigned non-zero
probability by |ψ2〉, specifically, p = 1− 2√5 ≈ 0.1056, we
have derived a contradiction from the assumption of the
transitivity of implication, and therefore also from the
assumption of an ontological model that is measurement-
noncontextual and outcome-deterministic for projective
measurements (i.e. traditionally-noncontextual) 11.
11 A slightly different way of seeing the contradiction is that tran-
This is a proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem which is
analogous to Hardy’s proof of Bell’s theorem, described
in Sec. IVE. Interestingly, it is not possible to generalize
this type of proof to the case of n > 5 using a set of vec-
tors that form an
{
n/n−12
}
star polygon. For instance,
in the case of n = 7, if we start with X1 = 1, in order to
make the inference from X2 = 0 to X3 = 1, from X4 = 0
to X5 = 1 and from X6 = 0 to X7 = 1, the quantum
state would have to lie in each of the following three sub-
spaces: the one spanned by |l2〉 and |l3〉, the one spanned
by |l4〉 and |l5〉 and the one spanned by |l6〉 and |l7〉. But
although any pair of these subspaces intersect along a
ray, the three do not, so there is no quantum state that
does the job.
The state-specific Kochen-Specker proof we have just
presented turns out to be related to Clifton’s 8-ray
Kochen-Specker proof [24]. The latter makes use of
the famous 8-vertex subgraph of the original 117-vertex
Kochen-Specker proof [1]. Clifton’s proof also has an
interesting connection with the pre and post-selection ef-
fect known as the “three-box paradox” [28], as shown
in Ref. [29]. A connection between Klyachko’s Kochen-
Specker proof and the 8-ray proof (as well as Hardy’s non-
locality proof) has also been noted previously in Ref. [30].
To see how our proof is related to Clifton’s, let us de-
note the vector orthogonal to the span of |l2〉 and |l3〉 by
|χ〉 and the one orthogonal to the span of |l4〉 and |l5〉
by |χ′〉 , then the orthogonality relations of the eight vec-
tors {|l1〉 , |l2〉 , |l3〉 , |l4〉 , |l5〉 , |χ〉 , |χ′〉 , |ψ2〉} are summa-
rized by the diagram in Fig. 3 (where nodes represent rays
and the presence of an edge represents orthogonality).
In an outcome-deterministic measurement-noncontextual
model, every vector must receive a value 0 or 1 with ex-
actly one member of every orthogonal triple receiving the
value 1, and no more than one member of an orthogonal
pair receiving the value 1.
∣χ′⟩ ∣l5⟩
∣χ⟩ ∣l2⟩
∣ψ2⟩ ∣l1⟩
∣l3⟩
∣l4⟩
FIG. 3. Clifton’s 8-ray state-specific Kochen-Specker proof.
Clifton’s proof can then be phrased as follows. Given
a preparation of |ψ2〉, the vector |ψ2〉 (considered as a
sitivity of implication specifies that X1 = 1 implies X5 = 1,
whereas by a joint measurement of X1 and X5, we would infer
that X1 = 1 implies X5 = 0.
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measurement outcome) must be assigned the value 1 and
the vector |l1〉 has a nonzero probability of being assigned
the value 1. We denote the value assigned to vector |φ〉
by v(|φ〉). From v (|ψ2〉) = 1 we infer v (|χ〉) = v (|χ′〉) =
0 and from v (|l1〉) = 1 (which happens with nonzero
probability) we infer v (|l2〉) = v (|l5〉) = 0. One then
concludes from v (|χ〉) = 0 and v (|l2〉) = 0 that v (|l3〉) =
1, and from v (|χ′〉) = 0 and v (|l5〉) = 0 that v (|l4〉) = 1.
However, v (|l3〉) = 1 and v (|l4〉) = 1 is a contradiction.
This is the standard way of deriving a contradiction
for the eight rays in Clifton’s proof, however one could
equally well use the fact that v (|χ〉) = v (|χ′〉) = 0 and
v (|l1〉) = 1 to justify anticorrelation across every edge
around the ring {|l1〉 , |l2〉 , |l3〉 , |l4〉 , |l5〉}, which is just
the proof we have presented above.
IV. NO-GO THEOREMS FOR BELL-LOCAL
MODELS
A. A separated pair of single-query 3-box systems
In this section, we consider another variation on
Specker’s parable. The seer has a novel 3-box system
which allows only a single box to be opened, rather than
two. To distinguish the two types of three-box systems,
we call the former a single-query system and the latter a
double-query system. We also assume that the seer can
prepare a pair of single-query systems that mimic the be-
havior of the double-query system as follows: if the same
box is opened on one system as is opened on the other,
one obtains the same result (both are always found to be
full, or both empty); if different boxes are opened, then
one obtains different results (one is always full and the
other empty). For the benefit of skeptical suitors, the
seer allows for the queries of the two different systems
to be implemented at space-like separation. We imagine
that they are transported to different corners of the As-
syrian empire: one to Abydos and the other to Babylon.
The suitor dispatches two of his trusted classmates, one
to each of these two cities, and instructs them to choose
a box at random.
We are therefore imagining a situation wherein two
observables are measured jointly by first preparing a pair
of systems in a perfectly correlated state and measuring
one observable on each.
As we will demonstrate below, this version of the
Specker parable allows us to establish a simple proof of
nonlocality in the same spirit as that presented by Mer-
min in Ref. [10]. Let us denote the choices made by the
two class-mates by a and b respectively, taking values
in the set {1, 2, 3}, corresponding to the choice of box.
Further, we denote the results of box a at Abydos and
box b at Babylon, respectively, by Aa and Bb, taking
values in {1, 0} corresponding to the observations {full,
empty}. Then we can express the condition that the out-
comes must satisfy in this two-wing version of the Specker
parable as
Aa ⊕Bb = 1⊕ δa,b, (31)
where δ denotes the Kronecker delta function. To quan-
tify the extent to which these correlations are realized, let
us define R3 as the weighted sum, assuming a and b are
chosen uniformly at random, of the probability of achiev-
ing perfect negative correlation when a 6= b, and the
probability of achieving perfect correlation when a = b.
That is,
R3 ≡1
9
∑
a,b:b6=a
p(Aa 6= Bb|Ma,Mb;P)
+
1
9
∑
a,b:b=a
p(Aa = Bb|Ma,Mb;P), (32)
where p(Aa = Bb|Ma,Mb;P) refers to the probability
of finding Aa = Bb conditioned on box a being opened
at Abydos and box b being opened at Babylon; likewise
for p(Aa 6= Bb|Ma,Mb;P).
The OS correlations described in the two-wing Specker
parable can be summarized as∑
Aa,Bb:Bb=Aa
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) = 1 for a = b,
∑
Aa,Bb:Bb 6=Aa
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) = 1 for a 6= b, (33)
The assumption that Ma and Mb are jointly measur-
able in the sense of definition (1) implies that they must
satisfy a condition of no superluminal signaling [17, 31],
namely,
p(Aa|Ma;P) =
∑
Bb
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) ∀ b,
p(Bb|Mb;P) =
∑
Aa
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) ∀ a (34)
which asserts that the conditional marginal probabilities
p(Aa|Ma;P) obtained by summing over Bb are inde-
pendent of the choice of the distant measurement pro-
cedure Mb, and likewise for p(Bb|Mb;P). It is simple
to show, as we do in Appendix D, that by imposing the
no-signaling condition, the correlations are constrained
to be of the following form:
∀ a 6= b :p(0, 1|Ma,Mb,P∗) = 1
2
,
p(1, 0|Ma,Mb;P∗) = 1
2
,
∀ a = b :p(0, 0|Ma,Mb,P∗) = 1
2
,
p(1, 1|Ma,Mb;P∗) = 1
2
. (35)
We will henceforth call these the nonlocal OS correla-
tions. The winning probability for Eq. (32) is unity for
these correlations, i.e.,
RNLOS3 = 1. (36)
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They are the only non-signaling correlations that can win
this prediction game deterministically. This implies, in
particular, that the nonlocal OS correlations represent
an extreme point of the convex set of non-signaling cor-
relations [32], very much like the archetypical PR box12
correlations [17] for the scenario where a, b only run from
1 to 2. Although these correlations do not allow for su-
perluminal signaling, they do violate Bell’s assumption
of local causality [33], as we now demonstrate.
In order to enforce perfect positive correlations when
the suitor’s two classmates make the same measurement,
the Babylonian system must be prepared with an an-
swer for each possible query that matches the answer that
the Abydosian system is prepared to provide. It follows
that there are deterministic noncontextual hidden vari-
ables determining the outcome on the Babylonian sys-
tem. This step is familiar from Bell’s original derivation
of his theorem [6]: locality together with the assumption
of perfect correlations implies the existence of determin-
istic noncontextual values for each system. Given such
values, it is easy to see 13 that the overall probability of
winning the game in a locally causal model is at most 79 .
That is,
R3 ≤ Rlocal3 =
7
9
. (37)
This is a Bell inequality. The fact that RNLOS3 = 1 for
the seer’s system is a violation of this Bell inequality and
a proof that no locally causal model of the nonlocal OS
correlations is possible.
The Bell inequality (37) can also be written in terms
of the more conventional correlation function, or the so-
called two-party correlator 〈A¯aB¯b〉, where A¯a, B¯b take
on values {+1,−1} as usual:
〈A¯aB¯b〉 =
∑
A¯a,B¯b:B¯b=A¯a
p(A¯a, B¯b|Ma,Mb;P)
−
∑
A¯a,B¯b:B¯b 6=A¯a
p(A¯a, B¯b|Ma,Mb;P) (38)
12 The terminology “box” is, in the present circumstances, unfor-
tunate. It refers to a “black-box” (i.e. unexplained — indeed,
inexplicable — source of correlations) between two distant par-
ties, just as in our above scenario.
13 For instance, if the values assigned to the state of the boxes
1,2, and 3 are 0, 0, 1, then we have positive correlation for
(a, b) ∈ {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)} and negative correlation for (a, b) ∈
{(1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}, in accordance with the nonlocal OS
correlations. However, we also have positive correlation for
(a, b) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)} in disagreement with the nonlocal OS cor-
relations. Thus the correlations are correct in only 7 out of 9
cases. Alternative strategies that do not enforce the perfect cor-
relation when a = b cannot do any better. For instance, if all
boxes on the left are empty and all boxes on the right are full,
then one has 6 out of 6 anti-correlations but 0 out of 3 correla-
tions, leaving a winning probability of 2/3, which is smaller than
7/9.
The two-party correlator is simply the average value of
the product of the result in Abydos when box a was
chosen, multiplied by the result in Babylon when box
b was chosen. Together with the normalization condi-
tion
∑
A¯a,B¯b
p(A¯a, B¯b|Ma,Mb,P) = 1, we can now re-
express the winning probability as R3 =
1
18S3+ 12 , where
S3 =
∑
a
〈
A¯aB¯a
〉−∑
a 6=b
〈
A¯aB¯b
〉
. (39)
In these notations, it is again easy to verify that if the
variables A¯a, B¯b admit pre-existing values±1 (i.e. are de-
termined by hidden variables), then S3 ≤ 5 [cf. Eq. (37)].
(As is now well-known [19], the same bound also applies
to any locally causal model where the values of the vari-
ables are determined by stochastic hidden variable mod-
els.) Specker’s correlations require S3 = 9, thus clearly
violating the Bell-inequality.
B. Mermin’s proof of Bell’s theorem
What about correlations allowed in quantum theory?
We know from a celebrated theorem by Cleve et al. (The-
orem 5.12, Ref. [34]) that there is no quantum strategy
that can give unit winning probability. While it is not
possible to realize the over-protective seer parable as for-
mulated above, it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate,
using quantum mechanics, correlations that approximate
the desired correlations better than any locally causal
model can. As it turns out, the largest winning proba-
bility allowed by quantum theory is (see Appendix E for
details)
Rquantum3 =
5
6
, (40)
and hence Squantum3 = 6 (which exceed the Bell-local
bounds of 79 and 5 respectively). That quantum the-
ory allows such non-trivial correlations can be verified
by considering the two-qubit maximally entangled state
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉) (in the σˆz basis) and letting A¯1, A¯2,
and A¯3 be the results of measuring the three Pauli oper-
ators equally spaced in the zˆ-xˆ plane, defined by
Aˆa = cos
2π(a− 1)
3
σˆz + sin
2π(a− 1)
3
σˆx; (41)
likewise for the Bˆb, which are defined identically. Thus
quantum mechanics allows us to move towards the ex-
tremal non-local correlations in our formulation of the
parable. This proof that quantum theory violates Bell-
locality (Bell’s theorem) is in fact the one popularized by
David Mermin [10].
1. Generalization to all odd n
It is straightforward to generalize this new parable to
the case of n boxes for all odd n ≥ 5. Specifically, posit
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a separated pair of n-box rings such that if the box that
is opened in Abydos is the same as the one opened in
Babylon, the outcomes agree, while if the index a of the
box opened in Abydos differs by 1 from the index b of
the one opened in Babylon, that is, if b = a ⊕ 1 or a =
b ⊕ 1, then the outcomes disagree. As it turns out, the
correlations must be of the form14
b = a⊕ 1 or a = b⊕ 1 :p(1, 0|Ma,Mb;P) = 1
2
p(0, 1|Ma,Mb;P) = 1
2
b = a :p(0, 0|Ma,Mb;P) = 1
2
p(1, 1|Ma,Mb;P) = 1
2
. (42)
We do not specify the nature of the correlation for other
values of a and b.
We can define the average probability of success as
Rn ≡ 1
3n
∑
a,b:b=a⊕1 or a=b⊕1
p(Aa 6= Bb|Ma,Mb;P)
+
1
3n
∑
a,b:b=a
p(Aa = Bb|Ma,Mb;P). (43)
It is evident that with a local strategy if one has perfect
correlation when a = b, then when a = b ⊕ 1 or b = a ⊕
1, one can have perfect anti-correlation with probability
at most (n − 1)/n. Furthermore, no local strategy can
do any better than this. Consequently, given that the
conditions a = b, a = b ⊕ 1, and b = a ⊕ 1 arise with
probability 1/3 each, the winning probability with a local
strategy is upper bounded by 15
Rn ≤ Rlocaln =
1
3
+
2
3
n− 1
n
= 1− 2
3n
. (44)
Quantum theory can violate this inequality. Using the
same entangled state as above, we generalize Eq. (41) to
Aˆa = cosϕaσˆz + sinϕaσˆx,
(45)
where ϕa =
n−1
n π(a−1), and likewise for the Bˆb (Fig. 4).
There are 3n kinds of measurement statistics that appear
in Rn. We consider each in turn. For the n terms wherein
a = b, we obtain perfect correlation with probability 1,
while for the n terms wherein a = b⊕ 1 and the n terms
wherein b = a ⊕ 1, we obtain anti-correlated outcomes
14 The proof of this proceeds analogously to the one given in Ap-
pendix D for the specific case of n = 3.
15 It is worth noting that none of the following Bell inequalities is
facet-inducing (following the terminology of Ref. [35]), or tight
(following the terminology of Ref. [36, 37]). That is, they do not
correspond to the boundary of the set of locally causal correla-
tions with maximal dimension.
with probability cos2(π/2n). In all then, we find the
corresponding probability of success as:
Rquantumn =
1
3
+
2
3
cos2
π
2n
≃ 1− π
2
6n2
. (46)
Once again, for a large number of suitors, the seer can
choose n, the number of measurement settings, to ensure
that with very high probability all of the suitors will lose,
despite their classically founded expectation that one of
their number is very likely to win.
FIG. 4. Representation of the observables used in the
Mermin-type proofs of nonlocality for n=3, 5 and 7. The ob-
servables are depicted by lines in a plane of the Bloch sphere.
The vertices of each line correspond to the eigenvectors of the
associated observable, with the labeled vertex associated with
eigenvalue 1.
C. Connection to previous work
An analogous game is discussed by Vaidman [38] who
considers a slightly different narrative device: a neck-
lace having an even number n of beads each of which
can be one of two colors and such that one finds all
adjacent beads to be of different colors except for the
first and last beads which are of the same color. It is
clear that by replacing the first and last beads by a sin-
gle bead, we have precisely the correlations considered
above. Another variation of the game was considered by
Braunstein and Caves [39]: there, perfect correlation is
required for all adjacent pairs of measurements except
that between the first and the last, in which case perfect
anti-correlation is required. This game gives rise to the
so-called “chained Bell inequalities” [39].
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The problem of maximizing the winning probabilityRn
is also relevant to the strength of a two-prover interactive
proof system of the type described by Cleve et al. [34].
The two provers are taken to be two agents of the seer
(one sent to Abydos and the other to Babylon), while
the suitor is the verifier. The provers’ task is to convince
the verifier that a cyclic graph with an odd number n
of vertices is 2-colorable (despite the fact that it is not).
The verifier sends the name of a vertex to each prover
such that the two vertices are either the same or adjacent.
The provers, who cannot communicate with one another,
must each respond with a color. The existence of systems
generating the nonlocal OS correlations would provide
the provers with a perfect winning strategy.
Cleve et al. have analyzed a two-player interactive
proof, called the odd cycle game, which is very similar to
the one we consider here. The odd cycle game is another
natural generalization of Specker’s parable to a pair of
systems where for a given measurement on the Abydosian
system, there are two rather than three options for the
measurement on the Babylonian system: it is the same,
i.e. b = a, or it has index one higher, i.e. b = a⊕ 1. The
possibility of a = b⊕ 1, which is allowed in the game we
have considered, and ensures symmetry between the two
players, is excluded in the odd cycle game. 16
D. From OS correlations to PR-box correlations
Another way of generalizing the single-query 3-box OS
correlations to a separated pair of parties is to imagine
that each party has a 3-box system, but the first party
only ever opens the first or second box, while the sec-
ond party only ever opens the second or third box. If we
imagine that there is correlation when they both open
the second box and anti-correlation otherwise, then this
set of measurements is already sufficient to obtain a con-
tradiction with a local model, Specifically, the local de-
terministic values must satisfy
A¯2B¯2 = +1, (47)
A¯1B¯2 = −1,
A¯1B¯3 = −1,
A¯2B¯3 = −1,
16 The upper bound on the winning probability with a local strategy
for the odd cycle game is clearly Rlocaln ≤
1
2
+ 1
2
n−1
n
= 1 −
1
2n
. The maximal quantum violation, which is determined in
Ref. [34], is achieved if the measurements on Alice’s system are
the spin operators Aa in Eq. (45), while the measurements on
Bob’s system are a rotation by an angle of pi/4n of the spin
operators Bb in Eq. (45). In this case, for the n terms wherein
a = b, we have correlation with probability cos2(pi/4n), and for
the n terms wherein b = a ⊕ 1, we have anti-correlation with
probability cos2(pi/4n), such that Rquantumn = cos
2(pi/4n) ≃ 1−
pi2
16n2
.
but the product of the left-hand-sides is A¯21A¯
2
2B¯
2
1B¯
2
2 =
+1, while the product of the right-hand-sides is −1. The
correlations of Eq. (47) are precisely the PR box corre-
lations [17] that have been extensively studied in recent
years.
E. Hardy-type no-go theorems for Bell-local
models
In outcome-deterministic ontological models that are
local or noncontextual, implications among value assign-
ments of observables are transitive because these value
assignments do not depend on the context (local or re-
mote) of the measurement. The failure of the transitivity
of implication therefore implies the impossibility of such
models. Again, we find that this conclusion has been
reached before in the literature on nonlocality. Specif-
ically, the Hardy-type proof of nonlocality [11] can be
expressed in this fashion [40], a fact that was first noted
by Stapp [41] (for a simplified account, see Refs. [42, 43]).
We begin by presenting Hardy’s proof of nonlocality in
its standard form. It uses a pair of binary-outcome ob-
servables on each wing of the experiment. Hardy demon-
strated a way of choosing these observables such that for
any partially entangled pure state, the correlations be-
tween these observables satisfy:
A1 = 1 =⇒ B1 = 1, (48)
B2 = 1 =⇒ A2 = 1, (49)
while
sometimes (A1 = 1 and B2 = 1) (50)
(i.e. with probability pHardy ≡ p(A1 = 1 and B2 = 1) >
0), and
never (A2 = 1 and B1 = 1) . (51)
We can express this as a failure of the transitivity of
implication as follows. From Eqs. (48), (51) and (49) (in
its contrapositive form), we infer respectively,
A1 = 1 =⇒ B1 = 1, (52)
B1 = 1 =⇒ A2 = 0, (53)
A2 = 0 =⇒ B2 = 0. (54)
which we summarize graphically by
A1 = 1 =⇒ B1 = 1
⇐=
A2 = 0 =⇒ B2 = 0
If transitivity held, then these three inferences would im-
ply that
A1 = 1 =⇒ B2 = 0. (55)
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However, this contradicts Eq. (50) and consequently
transitivity must fail. More explicitly, taking =⇒ to
be material implication, the negation of Eq. (55) is the
conjunction of A1 = 1 and B2 = 1,
¬ (A1 = 1 =⇒ B2 = 0) = (A1 = 1 and B2 = 1) , (56)
so that the probability pHardy ≡ p(A1 = 1 and B2 = 1)
quantifies the frequency with which the transitivity of
implication fails.
We now consider the status of this sort of proof for the
PR box. By relabeling the outcomes of the standard PR
box, one can obtain correlations of the form
A1 = B1 (57)
A1 = B2 (58)
A2 = B1 ⊕ 1 (59)
A2 = B2, (60)
with marginals of the form p(A1 = 0) = p (A2 = 0) =
p(B1 = 0) = p (B2 = 0) = 1/2. Eqs. (57), (59) and (60)
imply the inferences of Eqs. (52), (53), and (54) respec-
tively. Meanwhile, Eq. (58), together with the fact that
p(A1 = 1) = 1/2, implies that sometimes A1 = 1 and
B2 = 1, or equivalently, that sometimes Eq. (55) fails, so
that we have a contradiction with transitivity. Indeed,
the probability of this occurring is pHardy = p(A1 = 1
and B2 = 1) = 1/2.
Actually, pHardy only quantifies the probability for one
particular kind of contradiction, which requiresA1 = 1 to
get going. In the rest of the cases, where A1 = 0, we still
obtain a contradiction because Eqs. (57), (59) and (60)
also imply inferences of the form of Eqs. (52), (53), and
(54) where Aa ⇔ Aa ⊕ 1 and Bb ⇔ Bb ⊕ 1. Transitivity
then implies that A1 = 0 =⇒ B2 = 1, while Eq. (58)
contradicts this. So one obtains a contradiction with
certainty for the PR box.
There is another aspect of these PR box implications
that cannot be emulated by quantum theory which has
recently been pointed out by Fritz [44]: if one supple-
ments the implications in Eqs. (52)-(54) with the im-
plication B2 = 1 =⇒ A1 = 1 or any of the two re-
verse implications, that is, A2 = 0 =⇒ B1 = 1, or
B2 = 0 =⇒ A2 = 0, then the resulting set of con-
straints cannot be satisfied by any quantum state and
set of projective measurements.
As discussed in the introduction, and rehearsed in
Sec. III C, Specker introduced his parable of the over-
protective seer in order to demonstrate the possibility of
a logic wherein there is a failure of the transitivity of im-
plication. One therefore expects that the nonlocal OS
correlations from Sec. IVA, which are based on Specker’s
parable, ought to provide a proof of nonlocality via such
a failure of transitivity. This is indeed the case, as we
now show. The nonlocal OS correlations, cf. Eq. (31),
imply the following chain of implications
A1 = 1 =⇒ B1 = 1
⇐=
A2 = 0 =⇒ B2 = 0
⇐=
A3 = 1 =⇒ B3 = 1
If the transitivity of implication held, we would have
A1 = 1 =⇒ B3 = 1. (61)
However, Eq. (31) together with the fact that p(A1 =
1) = 1/2, cf. Eq. (35), implies that sometimes A1 = 1
and B3 = 0, which contradicts Eq. (61). Indeed,
we achieve this contradiction with probability pHardy =
p (A1 = 0 and B3 = 1) = 1/2. As with the PR box, one
can obtain a contradiction with certainty also in the cases
where A1 = 0.
Although the nonlocal OS correlations cannot be
achieved in quantum theory, it is interesting to ask
whether the particular contradiction constructed above
might be achieved with some nonzero probability for
some choice of state and observables. Indeed, this
is possible. In particular, this can be achieved with
pHardy = 144/(27 +
√
3)2 ≈ 0.17443 by using the quan-
tum state |ψ〉 = (1 + η2)−1/2(|0〉 |0〉 − η |1〉 |1〉) and the
projectors defined by:
Aˆa =
∣∣∣↑(A)a 〉〈↑(A)a ∣∣∣ , Bˆb = ∣∣∣↑(B)b 〉〈↑(B)b ∣∣∣ ,
where
∣∣∣↑(A)a 〉 =


1√
1+κ21
(κ1 |0〉+ |1〉) : a = 1,
1√
1+κ22
(|0〉 − κ2 |1〉) : a = 2,
1√
1+κ23
(|0〉+ κ3 |1〉) : a = 3,
,
∣∣∣↑(B)b 〉 =


1√
1+κ23
(−κ3 |0〉+ |1〉) : b = 1,
1√
1+κ22
(κ2 |0〉+ |1〉) : b = 2,
1√
1+κ21
(|0〉 − κ1 |1〉) : b = 3,
,
κa = η
(a+1mod3)+ 1
2 , and η =
√
3.
The above Hardy-type proof of nonlocality via the fail-
ure of the transitivity of implications is entirely equiva-
lent to the proof of nonlocality due to Boschi et al. [40].
Note that a slightly stronger contradiction with pHardy ≈
0.17455 can be obtained with a different choice of η [40].
Moreover, this latter value of pHardy is only marginally
different from the quantum-mechanical upper bound
pHardy ≤ 0.17456 obtained from the tools of Ref. [23].
This suggests that the strongest contradiction in this sce-
nario may already be achievable using a two-qubit par-
tially entangled pure state.17
17 See, however, Ref. [45] for some strong evidence that in some
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It is also worth noting that by considering a similar
setup that involves an increasing number of boxes, and
hence a longer chain of intransitive implications, quan-
tum theory actually provides a contradiction with in-
creasing pHardy that asymptotes to 50% [40].
We end this section with a demonstration that there is
a particular kind of failure of transitivity that one does
not find in quantum theory. We begin by noting that
with a PR box, we can get a contradiction with the tran-
sitivity of implication in a manner which is different from
that of Hardy’s proof, and in some ways more striking.
In addition to deriving Eqs. (52), (53) and (54) from
Eqs. (57), (59) and (60), we can derive
B2 = 0 =⇒ A1 = 0. (62)
Graphically, the chain of inferences is
A1 = 1 =⇒ B1 = 1
⇐=
A2 = 0 =⇒ B2 = 0
⇐=
A1 = 0
Were transitivity of implication to hold, we would con-
clude that A1 = 1 =⇒ A1 = 0, which, together with the
fact that p(A1 = 1) = 1/2, yields a contradiction. This
sort of proof is also available for the nonlocal OS correla-
tions. It can be characterized as providing a sequence of
inferences about values of observables wherein the conse-
quent of the last inference contradicts the antecedent of
the first inference. The question is whether this sort of
contradiction can be achieved in quantum theory. As it
turns out, it cannot, as we now demonstrate.
Consider an arbitrary pure bi-partite state |Ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗
HB where HA and HB are Hilbert spaces of dimension
d. Defining {|k〉}dk=1 to be an orthonormal basis of H,
ρ to be a density operator, 1ˆ to be the identity operator
and U to be a unitary operator, we can always write |Ψ〉
in the form
|Ψ〉 = (1ˆ⊗ U√ρ)∑
k
|k〉 ⊗ |k〉 . (63)
Now suppose that one measures system A with the
POVM
{|φ〉〈φ| , 1ˆ− |φ〉〈φ|} and one obtains the |φ〉〈φ|
outcome. This leads to an updating of the description of
the state of system B to
|χ〉 ≡ NχU√ρ |φ∗〉 (64)
cases, it may require infinite-dimensional Hilbert space to achieve
the strongest correlations allowed by quantum mechanics even
though the two-qubit correlations are only marginally different
from the quantum mechanical upper bound derived from the
tools of Ref. [23].
where
|φ∗〉 ≡
∑
k
〈k|φ〉∗ |k〉 , (65)
and Nχ is a normalization factor. Consequently, a
subsequent measurement on system B of the POVM{|χ〉〈χ| , 1ˆ− |χ〉〈χ|} will yield the |χ〉〈χ| outcome with
certainty.
Next, consider the experiment wherein{|φ〉〈φ| , 1ˆ− |φ〉〈φ|} is not made on A, but the
measurement
{|χ〉〈χ| , 1ˆ− {|χ〉〈χ|} is made on B and
the outcome |χ〉〈χ| is obtained. One then updates the
description of the state of system A to
|φ′〉 ∝ 〈χ| (1ˆ⊗ U√ρ)∑
k
|k〉 ⊗ |k〉
∝ 〈φ∗| (1ˆ⊗ ρ)∑
k
|k〉 ⊗ |k〉
∝ 〈φ∗| (ρT ⊗ 1ˆ)∑
k
|k〉 ⊗ |k〉
|φ′〉 = Nφ′ρT |φ〉 , (66)
where Nφ′ is a normalization factor. A subse-
quent measurement on system A of the POVM{|φ′〉〈φ′| , 1ˆ− |φ′〉〈φ′|} will then yield the |φ′〉〈φ′| out-
come with certainty.
The state |χ〉 on B is called the relative state to |φ〉
on A given |Ψ〉 on AB [46]. Similarly, |φ′〉 on A is the
relative state to |χ〉 on B given |Ψ〉 on AB. If we find
a particular state on one system, then we are certain to
find the relative state on the other should we measure
for it. Consequently, we can consider an arbitrary chain
of such pairs of measurements, and at every step in the
chain we can make a perfect inference from the positive
outcome of one to the positive outcome of the other.
We pause at this point in the proof to note that this
analysis provides a particularly simple way of under-
standing Hardy’s proof of nonlocality. Using reason-
ing analogous to that above, the relative state to |φ′〉 is
|χ′〉 where |χ′〉 ≡ UρU † |χ〉 (note that there clearly exist
choices of ρ and U such that |χ′〉 6= |χ〉). If the transitivity
of implication held, then by this sequence of perfect infer-
ences, we would conclude that whenever |φ〉〈φ| is found
on A, it would be the case that |χ′〉〈χ′| is necessarily
found on B. However, this conclusion is false because
the relative state to |φ〉 is |χ〉 , so that the probability of
finding |χ′〉〈χ′| on B is | 〈χ′|χ〉 |2 which is less than one
if |χ′〉 6= |χ〉 . Thus transitivity must fail.
We now show that a quantum proof of nonlocality
cannot be constructed in terms of a sequence of infer-
ences wherein the consequent of the last inference con-
tradicts the antecedent of the first. We define a set of
N observables on A, each of which is projective, namely,{∣∣φ(i)〉〈φ(i)∣∣ ∣∣ i = 1, . . . , N} and a set of N similar ob-
servables onB,
{∣∣χ(i)〉〈χ(i)∣∣ ∣∣ i = 1, . . . , N}. Here, ∣∣χ(i)〉
is the relative state to
∣∣φ(i)〉 and ∣∣φ(i+1)〉 is the relative
19
state to
∣∣χ(i)〉 . This implies that we can infer from find-
ing
∣∣φ(i)〉〈φ(i)∣∣ onA to the necessity of finding ∣∣χ(i)〉〈χ(i)∣∣
on B, and from finding
∣∣χ(i)〉〈χ(i)∣∣ on B to the necessity
of finding
∣∣φ(i+1)〉〈φ(i+1)∣∣ on A. If transitivity of impli-
cation held, then we could chain these inferences together
such that from finding
∣∣φ(1)〉〈φ(1)∣∣ on A, we would infer
the necessity of finding
∣∣φ(N)〉〈φ(N)∣∣ on A.
The question is whether we can ever have such a chain
where
∣∣φ(N)〉 is orthogonal to ∣∣φ(1)〉 . Note from the anal-
ysis above that
∣∣φ(i+1)〉 ∝ ρT ∣∣φ(i)〉 , so that∣∣∣φ(N)〉 ∝ (ρT )N ∣∣∣φ(1)〉 . (67)
Therefore the condition for orthogonality is
|
〈
φ(1)
∣∣∣ (ρT )N ∣∣∣φ(1)〉 |2 = 0. (68)
Given the non-negativity of ρ (and hence of ρT and(
ρT
)N
), this condition is only satisfied if ρT
∣∣φ(1)〉 = 0,
but this would imply that the probability of finding∣∣φ(1)〉〈φ(1)∣∣ on the bipartite state |Ψ〉 vanishes. In other
words, the only bipartite state for which we can have a
chain of inference wherein the final consequent denies the
initial antecedent is one that denies the initial antecedent.
Therefore, such a contradiction cannot be achieved. This
is in contrast to what occurs in the case of PR boxes and
the nonlocal OS correlations, and is therefore a feature
which distinguishes quantum theory from these foil the-
ories. It is interesting to note, however, that in quantum
proofs of contextuality one can find a chain of inferences
where the final consequent denies the initial antecedent
and the initial antecedent is sometimes true, as shown in
Sec. III C.
V. FRUSTRATED NETWORKS
It is instructive to consider a network representation of
the various correlations that we have considered thus far.
The bit associated with the outcome of a binary-outcome
measurement (this is the only type of measurement we’ve
considered) is associated with a node. Perfect positive
correlation between outcomes of distinct measurements
is represented by a solid line between the nodes, perfect
negative correlation by a dashed line. Such representa-
tions of correlations have been discussed before in the
context of nonlocality proofs, in particular by Mitchell,
Popescu and Roberts [47] and in the Ph.D. thesis of
Collins [48] and by Schmidt [49].
Fig. 5 provides network representations of the ex-
tremal correlations that were used in the no-go theorems
for measurement-noncontextual outcome-deterministic
models. The triangular network represents the OS cor-
relations in Specker’s parable; the square network repre-
sents the PR-box correlations (understood as a proof of
contextuality, i.e. where the four measurements are con-
sidered to be implemented in one spatial location); the
pentagonal network represents the extremal version of
the correlations in Klyachko’s no-go theorem; the hexag-
onal network represents the kind of correlations described
by Vaidman in Ref. [38].
FIG. 5. Frustrated networks representing the extremal corre-
lations in various proofs of contextuality.
Fig. 6 provides network representations of the extremal
correlations that were used in proofs of nonlocality. We
have labeled the nodes to highlight the spatial region
in which each of the outcomes occurs. The network on
the left, which is graph-isomorphic to the square net-
work above, represents the correlations generated by a
PR-box [17]. The network on the right depicts the corre-
lations found in the separated pair of single-query 3-box
systems of Sec. IV.
A1
A2
B1
B2
A1
A2
A3
B1
B2
B3
FIG. 6. Frustrated networks representing the extremal corre-
lations in various proofs of nonlocality.
Let the bit describing whether there is an even or an
odd number of dashed lines along a path be called the
parity of the path. We shall say that a network is frus-
trated if for any pair of nodes, there exist paths with
different parities connecting those nodes. Clearly, each
of the networks in Fig. 5 is frustrated. It is this frus-
tration which captures the impossibility of an outcome-
deterministic measurement-noncontextual model of these
correlations. For the networks given in Fig. 6, this im-
possibility also gives rise to a simple proof of nonlocality
of the depicted correlations.
For any network, we can determine whether or not it is
frustrated by looking only at its cycles. This is because
frustration occurs when there are two paths with differ-
ing parities and this fact will reveal itself by examining
the cycle consisting of that pair of paths. Thus, to see
the ways in which a network can be frustrated, it suffices
to consider the ways in which cycles can be frustrated.
For any integer number of nodes, it is straightforward to
find all the frustrated cycles with that number of nodes.
For two nodes, there is only a single path and therefore
no possibility for frustration. At 3 nodes, the frustrated
networks are those indicated in Fig. 7. The case of two
20
correlations and one anti-correlation corresponds, in the
imagery of Specker’s parable, to a case where if boxes 1
and 2 or boxes 1 and 3 are opened, one finds the same
outcome, but if boxes 2 and 3 are opened, the outcomes
always differ. Note, however, that these different net-
works are equivalent up to a relabeling of the outcomes
and consequently represent essentially the same correla-
tions.
FIG. 7. All the ways in which a triangular network can be
frustrated.
Indeed, all the frustrated networks with a given num-
ber of nodes can be obtained one from another by a rela-
beling of the outcomes. It therefore suffices to consider a
single representative of the equivalence class of frustrated
networks with a given number of nodes.
It is also possible to have a similar graphical represen-
tation for some of the no-go theorems for noncontextual-
ity and locality that are based on a failure of transitivity
of implication. We represent a set of implications among
the values of binary-outcome observables by a directed
graph with decorated edges. The implications of interest
are of the form: X1 = x =⇒ X2 = y where x, y ∈ {0, 1}
and either y = x or y = x⊕1. We depict this by inserting
a directed edge (i.e. an arrow) from the node for X1 to
the node forX2 and decorating the base of the arrow with
the value x; the directed edge is solid if y = x and dashed
if y = x⊕1. Note that this implication can also be written
in its contrapositive form as X2 = y⊕1 =⇒ X1 = x⊕1.
Therefore, we can always represent the same implication
with an arrow in the opposite direction. When reversing
an arrow, the value decorating the arrow stays the same
if the arrow is solid and flips if the arrow is dashed.
If the parity is odd around a closed loop in such a
directed graph, then the antecedent of the first implica-
tion is denied by the consequent of the last implication.
Therefore, as long as the antecedent has non-zero proba-
bility, we have a failure of the transitivity of implication.
Such a directed network is said to be frustrated.
In the introduction, we described how Specker’s para-
ble implies a failure of the transitivity of implication (un-
der the assumption that value-assignments to observables
are context-independent). Letting si denote the propo-
sition that Xi = 1 (box i contains a gem), the set of
implications are: s1 =⇒ ¬s2, ¬s2 =⇒ s3, and
s3 =⇒ ¬s1. These are represented by the directed net-
work of Fig. 8(a), which is clearly frustrated. The set of
implications that are used in the transitivity-based no-go
theorem of Sec. III C are represented by the pentagonal
version of this directed network, Fig. 8(b), which is also
frustrated.
Unlike the undirected frustrated networks, which are
composed of a set of correlations some or all of which
(a) (b)
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
FIG. 8. Some frustrated directed networks corresponding to
contextual correlations.
are only approximated by the quantum correlations, the
directed frustrated network of Fig. 8(b) is an exact spec-
ification of implications one finds in quantum theory,
specifically, those described in the proof of Sec. III C.
The only sense in which one could imagine a theory be-
ing “more contextual”, according to this sort of proof,
is by assigning a higher probability to the contradiction-
generating valuation of the first observable in the chain.
An extremal version of such a proof would be one wherein
both possible valuations of the first observable yielded a
contradiction. We conjecture that such a proof cannot
be found in quantum theory.
Finally, the “striking” form of the PR box correlations,
presented in Sec. IVE and associated with the set of
implications below Eq. (62), is represented by the frus-
trated directed network in Fig. 9(a), and the generaliza-
tion of this to the case of the nonlocal OS correlations
is represented in Fig. 9(b). As was shown at the end
(a) (b)
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FIG. 9. Some frustrated directed networks corresponding to
Bell-nonlocal correlations.
of Sec. IVE, it is not possible to find a quantum state
and a set of observables that instantiates such a set of
implications while assigning a nonzero probability to the
contradiction-generating valuation of the first observable.
VI. NO-GO THEOREMS FOR
PREPARATION-NONCONTEXTUAL MODELS
So far, in all of our quantum analogues of Specker’s
parable, the correlations examined were between the out-
comes of pairs of measurements that could be imple-
mented jointly. In this section, we consider the possibil-
ity of achieving these correlations between the outcomes
of pairs of measurements that are implemented consecu-
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tively18.
It is important to recognize that one need not rule
out the possibility of consecutive measurements to en-
sure the impossibility of joint measurements. The orig-
inal version of the Specker parable is misleading in this
respect. It asks us to imagine that after opening two
boxes, one is simply unable to open the third (as if its
lid were glued shut with an unbreakable seal). The lit-
eral generalization to arbitrary measurements M1, M2
and M3 that can be measured jointly pairwise but not
triplewise would seem to be that ifM1 andM2 have been
implemented, a mysterious force prevents us from carry-
ing out the instructions that correspond to implementing
M3. However, this conclusion does not follow from a de-
nial of joint measurability as it is defined in Sec. II A.
One can always implementM3 following a measurement
of M1 and M2 on a preparation P . It is just that the
statistics of outcomes of M3 that one thereby obtains
is not the same as one would have obtained if M3 were
implemented on P directly. To be precise, if the joint
statistics of outcomes of a pair of measurements M and
M′ are independent of the order in which they are imple-
mented, then the consecutive implementation of the two
measurements constitutes a joint measurement ofM and
M′ by the definition of Sec. II A. Consequently, a denial
of joint measurability implies a denial of the invariance of
statistics under a reordering of the measurements. This
way of interpreting a lack of joint measurability is pre-
cisely the one that is familiar from the quantum theory
of projective measurements.
To see how the OS correlations might obtain for con-
secutive measurements, we present a new parable. We
consider a single-query 3-box system, that is, one where
only a single box can be opened at a time. A pair of
boxes can be opened consecutively, but the second box-
opening need not reproduce the statistics of outcomes
that would have been observed had it been opened first.
In this sense, the measurements associated with opening
distinct boxes cannot be implemented jointly.
We now get to the specifics of the correlations, which
are inspired by the original Specker parable. We assume
that there is a special preparation P∗ of the 3-box system,
such that if the same box is opened at the two times,
then the same outcome is found, while if different boxes
are opened at the two times, then different outcomes are
found.
So far, there is nothing in this set of correlations
that prohibits their being explained by a generalized-
noncontextual ontological model. Because no two mea-
surements are ever implemented jointly in this parable,
there is no sense in which any measurement has a non-
trivial context upon which its ontological representation
18 Because implementing the first measurement and selecting a
particular outcome constitutes a preparation, one can equally
well describe this section as a consideration of the possibility of
achieving analogues of the OS correlations between preparations
and measurements. This is discussed further below.
might depend. Indeed, there are ontological models that
explain the correlations easily. They need only posit
that the first measurement disturbs the ontic state of
the three-box system in order to enforce the appropri-
ate correlations. For instance, suppose that three bits
specify the gem occupation numbers of the three boxes
and completely characterize the ontic state. It could be
that finding a 0 (1) for a box forces the other two boxes
to have occupation number 1 (0). (Indeed, if the suitor
is opening boxes on a table, this kind of disturbance to
the ontic state might be enforced by having a hidden
mechanism under the table that automatically inserts or
removes gems from the two boxes that were not opened.)
To obtain a set of correlations that can challenge the
assumption of generalized-noncontextuality, we need to
modify the thought experiment slightly by adding the
following assumption: in addition to the correlations
described, it is the case that after the early measurement
is complete, for every possible subsequent measurement
(the theory may well allow more than the three measure-
ments that are used in the protocol), it is impossible to
obtain any information about the identity of the early
measurement. We call this the trit-obliviousness condi-
tion (this terminology has its precedent in Ref. [50]).
Note that implementing the early measurement pro-
cedure and selecting a particular outcome constitutes a
preparation. For each of the three possible measurement
procedures, M1, M2 and M3, and each of the outcomes
0 and 1, we obtain a distinct preparation procedure. We
denote these by P1,0, P1,1, P2,0, P2,1, P3,0 and P3,1 in
an obvious notation. 19 We can also define the prepa-
rations that result when one chooses not to condition on
the outcome of the measurement procedure. We denote
these by P1, P2 and P3. Finally, we denote the prob-
ability of obtaining outcome 0 when the first measure-
ment Mt is implemented on the special preparation P∗
by wt,0 ≡ p(0|Mt;P∗), and we define wt,1 ≡ 1 − wt,0.
The statistics for the unconditional preparations are then
given by
p(X |M ;Pt) = wt,0p (X |M ;Pt,0) + wt,1p (X |M ;Pt,1) .
(69)
The trit-obliviousness condition states that preparation
procedures P1, P2 and P3 are operationally equivalent,
that is,
∀M : p(X |M ;P1) = p(X |M ;P2) = p(X |M ;P3). (70)
We now see how the new parable might have trou-
bles with generalized-noncontextuality. In Sec. II D, we
defined a preparation-noncontextual ontological model
19 Note that measurement procedures M1 and M ′1 that are in the
same operational equivalence class M1, may nonetheless define
preparation procedures that fail to be operationally equivalent,
because operational equivalence for preparation procedures is de-
cided by the statistics of all possible subsequent measurements.
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to be one wherein operational equivalence of prepara-
tion procedures implies that they are represented by the
same distributions in the ontological model, cf. Eq. (17).
Thus, from Eq. (70) and preparation noncontextuality,
we infer that
p(λ|P1) = p(λ|P2) = p(λ|P3). (71)
Given that convex combinations of preparation proce-
dures are represented in an ontological model by con-
vex combinations of the associated distributions (see
Ref. [12]), we infer from Eq. (71) that
w1,0p (λ|P1,0) + w1,1p (λ|P1,1)
= w2,0p (λ|P2,0) + w2,1p (λ|P2,1)
= w3,0p (λ|P3,0) + w3,1p (λ|P3,1) . (72)
The “preparation context” is the specification of which of
the three mixtures of preparation procedures was imple-
mented, and the assumption of preparation noncontex-
tuality is that the distribution over λ does not depend
on this context.
Equation (72) is a nontrivial constraint which is not
necessarily consistent with the posited correlations be-
tween the preparation procedures P1,0, P1,1, P2,0, P2,1,
P3,0 and P3,1 and the outcomes of the subsequent mea-
surements of M1, M2 or M3. Indeed, in the ontological
model we proposed above, where the ontic state is a triple
of bits specifying the occupation numbers of each box, the
distributions corresponding to the six preparation proce-
dures are:
p (λ|P1,0) = δλ,(0,1,1) (73)
p (λ|P1,1) = δλ,(1,0,0) (74)
p (λ|P2,0) = δλ,(1,0,1) (75)
p (λ|P2,1) = δλ,(0,1,0) (76)
p (λ|P3,0) = δλ,(1,1,0) (77)
p (λ|P3,1) = δλ,(0,0,1), (78)
where δ denotes the Kronecker delta function. Supposing
that w1,0 = w2,0 = w3,0 = 1/2, we have
p (λ|P1) = 1
2
δλ,(0,1,1) +
1
2
δλ,(1,0,0), (79)
p (λ|P2) = 1
2
δλ,(1,0,1) +
1
2
δλ,(0,1,0), (80)
p (λ|P3) = 1
2
δλ,(1,1,0) +
1
2
δλ,(0,0,1), (81)
and therefore
p (λ|P1) 6= p (λ|P2) 6= p (λ|P3) . (82)
So we find that the distributions representing P1, P2 and
P3 in the ontological model are distinct even though these
preparation procedures are operationally equivalent20 —
20 Remember that in the ontological model we are considering,
a violation of the assumption of preparation noncontex-
tuality.
We have demonstrated that the simple ontological
model suggested earlier to explain the two-time OS
correlations cannot also satisfy the condition of trit-
obliviousness while preserving preparation noncontex-
tuality. In the next subsection, we will show that
no ontological model that can explain the OS correla-
tions and the trit-oblivious condition can be preparation-
noncontextual. In this sense, a suitor who is committed
to generalized noncontextuality should be surprised if he
sees the specified two-time correlations after having con-
firmed the trit-obliviousness condition.
It is useful to summarize the correlations that we have
described above.
A. Diachronic pair of single-query 3-box OS
correlations
There are six possible preparation procedures, denoted
Pt,b where t ∈ {1, 2, 3} (t for trit) and b ∈ {0, 1},
and three possible measurement procedures, denoted My
where y ∈ {1, 2, 3} . For simplicity, we assume that the
prior over each of t, b and y to be uniform. The outcome
X of the measurement procedureMy given a preparation
procedure Pt,b is the following function of t, b and y,
cy(t, b) ≡ b if t = yb⊕ 1 if t 6= y , (83)
that is, the correlations are such that
p(X = cy(t, b)|My;Pt,b) = 1. (84)
Finally, defining the effective preparation procedure Pt
as the mixture of Pt,0 and Pt,1, it is assumed that no
measurement can reveal any information about which of
P1, P2 or P3 was implemented,
∀M : p(X |M ;P1) = p(X |M ;P2) = p(X |M ;P3). (85)
This is the trit-obliviousness condition.
Defining the average probability of success as
R3 ≡ 1
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∑
t,b,y
p(X = cy(t, b)|My;Pt,b), (86)
we can also characterize the two-time OS correlations as
those achieving R3 = 1. Using the trit-obliviousness con-
dition, we shall see that the assumption of preparation
the measurement My simply reveals the value of the yth bit,
that is, p(X = λy|My; (λ1, λ2, λ3)) = 1. It follows that
∑
λ
p(X = 0|My;λ)p(λ|Pt) =
1
2
for all y, t ∈ {1, 2, 3} , and con-
sequently, the two outcomes of My occur with equal probabil-
ity given a preparation procedure Pt. Therefore, the ontological
model captures the fact that P1, P2 and P3 are operationally
indistinguishable.
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noncontextuality places a bound on the average proba-
bility of success, namely,
R3 ≤ RPNC3 =
7
9
. (87)
We refer to this bound as a noncontextuality inequality.
The proof is as follows. For any measurement M, the
probability of outcome X given preparation Pt is simply
p(X |M ;Pt) = 1
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
p(X |M ;Pt,b). (88)
Similarly, the probability of the ontic state λ given an
implementation of Pt is simply
p(λ|Pt) = 1
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
p(λ|Pt,b). (89)
Given the trit-obliviousness condition, Eq. (85),
and the assumption of preparation noncontextuality,
Eq. (17), we infer that p(λ|P0) = p(λ|P1) = p(λ|P2),
which states that mixed preparations corresponding to
different values of the trit t are not only indistinguish-
able at the operational level, but at the ontic level as well.
Therefore, even if one knew λ, the posterior probabilities
for t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3 would be the same, that is,
one would know nothing about the trit t. The argument
so far can be summarized as follows: for preparation-
noncontextual models, trit-obliviousness at the opera-
tional level implies trit-obliviousness at the ontic level.
The ontic state λ provides a classical encoding of (t, b),
but one that does not contain any information about t.
To finish the argument, we take note of all the func-
tions of t and b that contain no information about t.21
These are equivalent, up to an affine transformation (i.e.
up to a scalar multiple and an additive constant), to one
of the following four functions
t, b b c1(t, b) c2(t, b) c3(t, b)
1, 0 0 0 1 1
1, 1 1 1 0 0
2, 0 0 1 0 1
2, 1 1 0 1 0
3, 0 0 1 1 0
3, 1 1 0 0 1
(90)
where cy(t, b) is defined in Eq. (83). In an ontological
model that respects preparation noncontextuality and
the trit-obliviousness condition, the ontic state must be
given by one of these four functions, that is, p (λ|Pt,b) =
21 In the sense that for any given value of the function f(t, b), the
conditional probability p(t|f(t, b)) = 1/3 for all t.
δλ,b or δλ,c1(t,b) or δλ,c2(t,b) or δλ,c3(t,b). Note that in each
case, the ontic state space is a single bit 22.
In the case of an ontological model wherein λ = b, the
best the measurement device can do is to always output
b ⊕ 1 because with probability 2/3, y 6= t and cy(t, b) =
b ⊕ 1, while with probability 1/3, y = t and cy(t, b) =
b. Thus, for this ontological model, the average success
probability is 2/3.
In the case of an ontological model wherein λ = c1(t, b),
the best the measurement device can do is to output
c1(t, b) when y = 1 and c1(t, b) ⊕ 1 when y 6= 1. Note
that c1(t, b)⊕ 1 = c2(t, b) for 2/3 of the values of t, b and
c1(t, b) ⊕ 1 = c3(t, b) also for 2/3 of the values of t, b.
(To see this, it suffices to take the negation of the c1(t, b)
column of the table and compare it with the c2(t, b) and
c3(t, b) columns.) So we see that this choice of output
generates the right correlations 2/3 of the time for y 6=
1. Thus for this ontological model, the overall success
probability is 7/9.
By symmetry, the cases of λ = c2(t, b) and λ =
c3(t, b) also achieve a success probability of at most 7/9.
Therefore, the probability of success in a preparation-
noncontextual ontological model is bounded above by
7/9.
B. Quantum case
We now consider to what extent one can achieve the
diachronic OS correlations in quantum theory. The fol-
lowing is a protocol that uses a single qubit. The three
measurements correspond to the three Pauli operators Aˆt
of Eq. (41) corresponding to directions equally spaced in
an equatorial plane of the Bloch sphere. The positive and
negative eigenvalues are mapped onto outputsX = 0 and
X = 1 respectively. The preparation procedures Pt,0 and
Pt,1 correspond to the two eigenstates of Aˆt, with pos-
itive and negative eigenvalues mapped onto b = 0 and
b = 1 respectively. We denote these states by the Hilbert
space vectors |φt,b〉. The Bloch sphere representation of
these states and measurements is provided in Fig. 10.
When y = t, the preparation corresponds to an eigen-
state of the observable being measured, and the outcome
X equals the bit b. Thus, X = cy(t, b) with probability
1 in this case. When y 6= t, the probability of obtaining
X = b is |〈φt,b|φy,b〉|2 = cos2(π/3) = 1/4 while the prob-
ability of obtaining X = b ⊕ 1 and thus X = cy(t, b) is
3/4. We have y 6= t in 2/3 of cases, so that the overall
probability of success is
Rquantum3 =
5
6
. (91)
22 It is not a triple of bits and therefore cannot specify the occu-
pation numbers of each of the three boxes. In this sense, the
narrative device of a three-box system cannot do justice to this
version of the parable. We must think about the preparations
and measurements more abstractly.
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Meanwhile, no information about t can be ob-
tained by any quantum measurement given that
the mixtures associated with different values of
t are represented by the same density operator:
1
2 |φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|+ 12 |φ0,1〉〈φ0,1|= 12 |φ1,0〉〈φ1,0|+ 12 |φ1,1〉〈φ1,1|
= 12 |φ2,0〉〈φ2,0|+ 12 |φ2,1〉〈φ2,1| = 1ˆ/2. Thus we have a vi-
olation of the noncontextuality inequality of Eq. (87).
FIG. 10. Quantum states and observables used for proof of
the impossibility of a preparation-noncontextual ontological
model.
Note that the OS correlations are useful for achiev-
ing the following two-party secure computation, which
is a kind of multiplexing. Let the two parties be called
Alice and Bob. Alice has as input a trit t ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, each chosen uniformly at random.
Bob has as input a trit y ∈ {1, 2, 3} chosen uniformly at
random. Bob outputs a bit c and the goal of the task is
for Bob to output c = cy(t, b), that is, Bob should out-
put b if y = t and the negation of b otherwise. Alice can
send a system to Bob encoding information about her
input, however there is a cryptographic constraint: no
information about the trit t can be transmitted to Bob,
which is to say that the protocol must be trit-oblivious.
This information-theoretic manner of characterizing the
correlations provides a connection with the discussion of
preparation noncontextuality found in Ref. [50].
C. Justifying preparation noncontextuality by
locality
As discussed in Ref. [12], it is sometimes possible to jus-
tify an assumption of preparation noncontextuality using
Bell’s assumption of local causality [33]. This is the case
for the assumptions of preparation noncontextuality that
appear in the derivation of the noncontextuality inequal-
ity of Eq. (87). It suffices to note that if one implements
a measurement procedure on half of a correlated pair of
systems and one conditions upon its outcome, then this
procedure can also be considered a preparation procedure
for the other half of the correlated pair. Indeed, given the
separated pair of single-query 3-box systems considered
in Sec. IVA, every measurement procedure Mt on the
3-box system in Abydos chosen from t ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
yielding outcome b ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to a prepara-
tion procedure Pt,b for the 3-box system in Babylon. If
Mt is measured in Abydos but one does not condition
on the outcome, then this corresponds to a preparation
procedure Pt of the system in Babylon. In this case, the
probability of observing an outcome X for a measure-
ment of My in Babylon given a preparation Pt,b is pre-
cisely equal to the probability of observing an outcome
X for a measurement ofMy in Babylon given an outcome
b for Mt in Abydos . There is an isomorphism between
the diachronic pair of single-query 3-box systems and the
separated pair.
Now suppose that the Abydosian and Babylonian mea-
surements are space-like separated. In this case, the
no-signaling constraint ensures that the choice of t in
Abydos cannot influence the outcome statistics of any
measurement in Babylon and consequently that the three
preparation procedures P1, P2 and P3 are operationally
equivalent, that is, ∀M : p(X |M ;P1) = p(X |M ;P2) =
p(X |M ;P3). This is the condition of trit-obliviousness.
Furthermore, an assumption of local causality implies
that the choice of measurement in Abydos also cannot
influence the distribution over ontic states for the 3-box
system in Babylon. Denoting the ontic state of the Baby-
lonian system by λ, local causality implies p(λ|P1) =
p(λ|P2) = p(λ|P3). But this is precisely the content of the
assumption of preparation noncontextuality for the oper-
ationally equivalent procedures P1, P2 and P3. Therefore
local causality justifies this assumption.
This reasoning also shows that any local strategy
for winning the prediction game for the separated pair
of single-query 3-box systems implies a preparation-
noncontextual strategy for winning the prediction game
for the diachronic pair with the same winning probability
23 It follows that another way to derive the local bound
of 7/9 for the probability of achieving the OS correla-
tions for the separated pair, Eq. (37), is to appeal to this
implication and the fact that the optimal preparation-
noncontextual strategy achieves a winning probability of
7/9 for the diachronic pair, as shown in Eq. (87).
VII. JOINT MEASURABILITY OF POVMS
Regarding this section, see also the erratum
As we showed early on, we cannot find a triple of pro-
jective measurements in quantum theory that are jointly
measurable pairwise but not triplewise. However, not all
measurements in quantum theory are projective. The
most general measurement is one that is associated with
a positive operator valued measure (POVM). A POVM
is a set of operators {EX : X ∈ S} such that EX ≥ 0,
23 It has been shown that for every inequality on correlations be-
tween pairs of separated measurements that is implied by the
assumption of a local ontological model, an equivalent inequality
for the correlations between preparations and measurements is
implied by the assumption of a preparation-noncontextual onto-
logical model [51].
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and
∑
X EX = 1ˆ. The parameter X labels the outcomes
of the measurement, which we assume form a discrete
set. If the preparation procedure preceding the measure-
ment is represented by the density operator ρ, then the
probability of outcome X is given by Tr(ρEX).
In this section, we consider the question of whether
one could find a triple of non-projective measurements
in quantum theory that are pairwise but not triplewise
jointly measurable. As it turns out, this is indeed possi-
ble.
First, we adapt the definition of joint measurability to
the case of POVMs. A pair of measurements associated
with POVMs {E1X1} and {E2X2} are jointly measurable
iff there exists a third POVM {FX1,X2} such that E1X1 =∑
X2
FX1,X2 and E
2
X2
=
∑
X1
FX1,X2 . It is worth noting
that the problem of mathematically characterizing jointly
measurable observables when these are not projective is
a subject of on-going research [13–16].
We will consider two examples of such triples of
POVMs such that any pair can be implemented jointly,
but the triple cannot. They both make use of noisy spin
observables. The three measurements we consider, la-
belled by an integer k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are associated with
POVMs
{
Ek+, E
k
−
}
Ek± ≡
1
2
1ˆ± η
2
~σ · nˆk, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, (92)
where ~σ = (σx, σy , σz) is the vector of Pauli spin opera-
tors, whilst nˆ1, nˆ2 and nˆ3 are the three axes along which
the spin is measured. Note that the POVM
{
Ek+, E
k
−
}
can be written as a convex combination of the projective
spin measurement along nˆk — associated with the pro-
jectors Πk± ≡ 12 1ˆ± 12~σ ·nˆk — and the trivial measurement
{1ˆ/2, 1ˆ/2}. That is,
Ek± = (1− η)
1
2
1ˆ+ ηΠk±. (93)
This is the sense in which we can consider
{
Ek+, E
k
−
}
with
η < 1 to be a noisy version of the observable ~σ · nˆk.
A. Orthogonal spin axes
Our first example of such a triple of nonprojective
measurements uses noisy versions of spin operators along
three orthogonal axes:
nˆ1 = zˆ ≡ (0, 0, 1),
nˆ2 = xˆ ≡ (1, 0, 0),
nˆ3 = yˆ ≡ (0, 1, 0). (94)
Proposition 8. The triple of measurements defined by
Eqs. (92) and (94), that is, noisy spin observables along
three orthogonal axes, are pairwise jointly measurable iff
η ≤ 1/√2 ≈ 0.707, but triplewise jointly measurable iff
η ≤ 1/√3 ≈ 0.577.
In other words, the condition 1/
√
3 < η ≤ 1/√2 is nec-
essary and sufficient for the triple to be pairwise jointly
measurable but not triplewise jointly measurable.
This result is proven in Ref. [14], but for complete-
ness, we provide an independent proof in Appendix F.
For pedagogical reasons, we also provide a geometric pic-
ture in the Bloch sphere of the measurements that sat-
urate these inequalities. To this end, defining the index
set I ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, we introduce the (unnormalized Bloch)
vectors
~m{Xk}k∈I ≡
∑
k∈I
Xknˆk, (95)
where Xk ∈ {−1,+1} and write the respective unit vec-
tors as mˆ{Xk}k∈I .
The POVM that measures a noisy spin observable
along the zˆ-axis jointly with the one along the xˆ-axis
and that saturates η ≤ 1/√2 is of the form{
FX1X2 ≡
1
2
ΠX1X2
}
(96)
where the projectors {ΠX1X2} are associated with Bloch
vectors {mˆX1X2} forming the vertices of a square in
the zˆ-xˆ plane, depicted in Fig. 11. Coarse-graining
over X2 yields the POVM
{
F 1± ≡ 12 1ˆ+ 12~σ · ~s1±
}
where
~s1± ≡ ± 1√2 zˆ, which is to say, a measurement of the η-
sharp spin observable along the zˆ axis with η = 1√
2
,
depicted in Fig. 11. Similarly, coarse-graining over X1
yields noisy spin observable associated with Bloch vec-
tors ~s2± = ± 1√2 xˆ, which is to say along the xˆ axis with
η = 1√
2
. Joint measurements of every other pair of spin
axes are described similarly.
FIG. 11. Bloch sphere representation of the joint measure-
ment of the noisy spin observables along the xˆ and zˆ axes.
The POVM that measures noisy spin observables along
axes zˆ, xˆ and yˆ jointly and that saturates η ≤ 1/√3
is of the form
{
FX1X2X3 ≡ 14ΠX1X2X3
}
where the pro-
jectors {ΠX1X2X3} are associated with the Bloch vec-
tors {mˆX1X2X3} forming the vertices of a cube, depicted
in Fig. 12. Coarse-graining over X2 and X3 yields the
POVM
{
F 1± ≡ 12 1ˆ+ 12~σ · ~s1±
}
where ~s1± = ± 1√3 zˆ, which
is to say an η-sharp spin observable along the zˆ axis with
η = 1/
√
3, also depicted in Fig. 12. Similarly, coarse-
graining over X1 and X3 yields a noisy spin observ-
able associated with Bloch vectors ~s2± = ± 1√3 xˆ, while
coarse-graining over X1 and X2 yields one associated
with ~s3± = ± 1√3 yˆ.
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FIG. 12. Bloch sphere representation of the joint measure-
ment of the noisy spin observables along the xˆ, yˆ and zˆ axes.
It is clear from these geometric representations that
the reason there is a gap between the noise required for
jointly measuring a pair and that required for jointly
measuring the triple is that the length of the edge of
a cube inscribed in a sphere is less than that of a square
inscribed in an equatorial plane of that sphere.
Joint measurements of observables along orthogonal
spin axes are not very useful for approximating the OS
correlations. Indeed, defining the probability of obtain-
ing anti-correlated outcomes when a pair of nonprojective
measurements is implemented jointly, averaged uniformly
over the three pairs,
R3 ≡ 1
3
∑
j 6=k
p(Xj 6= Xk|Mjk;λ), (97)
we find the following result.
Proposition 9. For the triple of measurements defined
by Eqs. (92) and (94), that is, noisy spin observables
along three orthogonal axes, the quantum probability of
anti-correlation when a pair is measured jointly, averaged
uniformly over the three pairs is
Rquantum3 =
1
2
. (98)
(independent of the quantum state).
Proof. The intuitive reason is that each pair of spin ob-
servables is unbiased. More precisely, if we coarse-grain
over the effects in the joint POVM {FX1X2} of Eq. (96)
with outcomes corresponding to anti-correlation, we get
F+− + F−+ =
1
2
1ˆ. (99)
Therefore, for all quantum states, the probability of find-
ing anti-correlated results is 1/2.
There is consequently no bias towards anti-correlation
and therefore this triple of measurements is not helpful
for approximating the OS correlations.
B. Trine spin axes
Our second example consists of noisy versions of spin
observables along three axes equally separated in a plane
(i.e. separated by a trine or an angle of 120◦):
nˆ1 = (0, 0, 1)
nˆ2 =
(√
3
2
, 0,−1
2
)
nˆ3 =
(
−
√
3
2
, 0,−1
2
)
. (100)
These are depicted in Fig. 13.
Proposition 10. The triple of measurements defined by
Eqs. (92) and (100), that is, noisy spin observables along
three equally-spaced axes in a plane, are pairwise jointly
measurable if η ≤ √3−1 ≃ 0.732 05, but triplewise jointly
measurable only if η ≤ 2/3.
In other words, the condition 2/3 < η ≤ √3 − 1 is
sufficient for the triple to be pairwise jointly measurable
but not triplewise jointly measurable.
Again, the proof is provided in Appendix F, but we can
understand the result geometrically. The trine directions
nˆ1, nˆ2 and nˆ3 of Eq. (100) are indicated in Fig. 13. The
POVM that measures a noisy spin observable along the
nˆ1-axis jointly with the one along the nˆ3-axis and that
saturates η ≤ √3− 1 is of the form
{FX1X2 ≡ wX1X2ΠX1X2} (101)
where
w++ = w−− =
1√
3 + 1
(102)
w+− = w−+ =
√
3√
3 + 1
, (103)
and where the projectors {ΠX1X2} are associated with
Bloch vectors {mˆX1X2} forming the vertices of a square,
depicted in Fig. 13. Coarse-graining over X2 yields the
POVM
{
F 1± ≡ 12 1ˆ+ 12~σ · ~s1±
}
with ~s1± = ±
(√
3− 1) nˆ1
depicted in Fig. 13. Similarly, coarse-graining over X1
yields a noisy spin observable associated with Bloch vec-
tors ~s3± = ±
(√
3− 1) nˆ3. Joint measurements of every
other pair of spin axes are described similarly.
FIG. 13. Bloch sphere representation of the joint measure-
ment of the noisy spin observables along trine axes nˆ1 and
nˆ3.
The POVM that measures noisy spin observables along
axes nˆ1, nˆ2 and nˆ3 jointly and that saturates η ≤ 2/3
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is of the form {FX1X2X3 ≡ wX1X2X3ΠX1X2X3} where
w+++ = w−−− = 0 (implying that one never obtains
a triplewise coincidence in the joint measurement) while
w+−− = w−++ = w+−+ = w−+− = w−−+ = w++− =
1/3 and where the projectors {ΠX1X2X3} are associ-
ated with Bloch vectors {mˆX1X2X3} forming the vertices
of a hexagon for the six values of X1X2X3 such that
wX1X2X3 6= 0, as depicted in Fig. 14. Coarse-graining
over X2 and X3 yields the POVM
{
F 1± ≡ 12 1ˆ+ 12~σ · ~s1±
}
where ~s1± = ± 23 nˆ1, depicted in Fig. 14. Similarly, coarse-
graining over X1 and X3 yields a noisy spin observ-
able associated with Bloch vectors ~s2± = ± 23 nˆ2, while
coarse-graining over X1 and X2 yields one associated
with ~s3± = ± 23 nˆ3. Note that, unlike the three previous ex-
amples, the Bloch-directions of the fine-grained (saturat-
ing) POVM elements coincide with the Bloch-directions
of the coarse-grained POVM elements. This is a pecu-
liarity of geometry, and is a feature also seen in the dual
problem of identifying pure-state ensembles that saturate
the bounds of so-called EPR-steering inequalities [52].
FIG. 14. Bloch sphere representation of the joint measure-
ment of the noisy spin observables along trine axes nˆ1, nˆ2
and nˆ3.
Given the discussion in Sec. IVB, one might expect the
trine spin observables to instantiate a better approxima-
tion of the OS correlations. Indeed, we have the following
proposition that supports this intuition.
Proposition 11. For the triple of measurements defined
by Eqs. (92) and (100), that is, a triple of noisy spin
observables along trine axes, the quantum probability of
anti-correlation when a pair is measured jointly, averaged
uniformly over the three pairs is
Rquantum3 =
√
3√
3 + 1
≃ 0.63397. (104)
(independent of the quantum state).
Proof. If, in the joint measurement of Eq. (101), we
coarse-grain the two effects that correspond to anti-
correlation, we obtain
F+− + F−+ =
√
3√
3 + 1
1ˆ, (105)
from which the result follows trivially.
Can we explain this degree of anti-correlation within
a generalized-noncontextual ontological model? Given
that the measurements involved are nonprojective, we
need not represent them as assigning deterministic out-
comes for every ontic state. Indeed, as discussed in
Sec. II D, for nonprojective measurements, one is not war-
ranted in assuming outcome determinism. It follows that
the bound of 2/3 on the probability of anti-correlation,
Eq. (12), which we derived under the assumption of mea-
surements being projective, need not apply. Conceiv-
ably, the bound implied by generalized noncontextuality
could be smaller for nonprojective measurements, and
the quantum degree of anti-correlation might therefore
still violate it. As it turns out however, the bound is actu-
ally larger for nonprojective measurements, and therefore
the quantum degree of anti-correlation is entirely con-
sistent with an ontological model that is measurement-
noncontextual and outcome-deterministic for projective
measurements. We show this now.
C. Generalized-noncontextual models for joint
measurements of POVMs
Each measurement that is modeled by a POVM of the
form of Eq. (92) can be considered as a convex combi-
nation of a projective measurement and a measurement
of the trivial two-outcome POVM {1ˆ/2, 1ˆ/2}, as seen in
Eq. (93). In Ref. [18], it is proven that within any on-
tological model, the response function that represents a
convex combination of measurement procedures is sim-
ply the convex combination of the associated response
functions. Ref. [18] also contains a proof that within
a measurement-noncontextual model, the response func-
tion that represents each outcome of the trivial two-
outcome POVM {1ˆ/2, 1ˆ/2} is the uniform function 1/2,
i.e., regardless of the value of λ in the ontological model,
the two outcomes occur with equal probability. We also
recall from Sec. II E that in models of quantum theory,
preparation noncontextuality implies outcome determin-
ism for projective measurements. From these facts, we
obtain the following result.
Lemma 12. In an ontological model that is generalized-
noncontextual, the response function for the η-sharp spin
observable of Eq. (92), denoted by Mk, is
p (Xk|Mk;λ) = η[Xk (λ)] + (1− η)
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
,
(106)
where [X(λ)] denotes the response function p (X |λ) = 1
if X = X(λ) and 0 otherwise.
This yields a strong constraint on the response function
for the joint measurement, denotedM12, of η-sharp spin
observables along distinct axes. The joint response func-
tion p (X1, X2|M12;λ) must yield p (X1|M1;λ) when av-
eraged overX2 and p (X2|M2;λ) when averaged overX1.
The most general form that can recover these marginals
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is
p(X1, X2|M12;λ) = α[X1(λ)][X2(λ)] (107)
+ β[X1(λ)]
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
+ γ
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
[X2(λ)]
+ δ
(
1
2
[0] [0] +
1
2
[1][1]
)
+ ε
(
1
2
[0][1] +
1
2
[1] [0]
)
.
where the marginals are
p(X1|M12;λ) = (α+ β) [X1(λ)] (108)
+ (γ + δ + ε)
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
p(X2|M12;λ) = (α+ γ) [X2(λ)] (109)
+ (β + δ + ε)
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
,
so that we require
α+ β = α+ γ = η, (110)
γ + δ + ε = β + δ + ε = 1− η. (111)
We infer that β = γ.
In order to give the model the best chance of reproduc-
ing the operational statistics, we consider what values
of α, β, γ, δ and ε achieve the largest possible amount
of anti-correlation. The δ terms always yields correla-
tion, while the β and γ terms yield correlation as of-
ten as anti-correlation. Only the α and ε terms can
have anti-correlation more frequently than correlation.
Thus, to maximize the amount of anti-correlation, one
sets β = γ = δ = 0. It then follows that α = η and
ε = 1− η.
The same reasoning applies for the joint measurements
ofM1 andM3 and ofM2 andM3, so that for all i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3} such that i 6= j,
p(Xi, Xj |Mij ;λ) = η[Xi(λ)][Xj(λ)] (112)
+ (1− η)
(
1
2
[0][1] +
1
2
[1] [0]
)
.
The question then arises of how much anti-correlation
one can have on average for a pair of measurements
(assuming the pair is chosen uniformly at random),
that is, what is the upper bound on R3 of Eq. (97)?
For every λ, at most two out of the three prod-
ucts [X1(λ)][X2(λ)], [X1(λ)][X3(λ)] and [X2(λ)][X3(λ)]
can yield anti-correlation, so the probability of anti-
correlation for the η term is at most 2/3. Meanwhile,
the 1− η term always yield anti-correlation. Therefore,
R3 ≤ η
(
2
3
)
+ (1− η) = 1− η
3
. (113)
One might have expected that the ability to add noise
to the response function in the ontological model would
not help explain a high degree of anti-correlation, but
such an expectation fails to take into account the fact
that the noise can itself be anti-correlated and thereby ex-
plain more anti-correlation in the statistics. Thus rather
than only being able to explain a probability of anti-
correlation of 2/3 in a generalized-noncontextual model,
we can explain a probability of anti-correlation of 1 − η3
which is always greater than 2/3 because η ≤ 1. For
instance, for η = 1/
√
2, the upper bound on R3 is
1 − 1/(3√2) ≃ 0.76430, while for η = √3 − 1, it is
(4−√3)/3 ≃ 0.75598.
Because the degree of anti-correlation we found in
quantum theory was less than 2/3 in both exam-
ples, there is no problem providing a generalized-
noncontextual model. More precisely, the degree of quan-
tum anti-correlation obtained in the example with or-
thogonal spin axes can be explained noncontextually be-
cause Rquantum3 = 1/2 < 0.76430, and the degree ob-
tained in the example with the trine spin axes can be ex-
plained noncontextually because Rquantum3 = 0.63397 <
0.75598.
Is it the case that for all triples of nonprojective quan-
tum measurements that can be implemented pairwise
but not triplewise, the strength of anti-correlations can
be explained by a generalized-noncontextual ontological
model? The question remains open, but we expect a pos-
itive answer.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There has been a lot of work in recent years on “foils to
quantum theory”, operational theories that one studies
not primarily as competitors to quantum theory, but as
useful tools for getting a handle on the principles underly-
ing it. Only by situating quantum theory in a landscape
of possible theories does it make sense to speak of the
principles that pick it out, to answer Wheeler’s question:
“how come the quantum?”. Specker’s parable provides
an interesting new kind of foil, because the kind of com-
plementarity it exhibits — three measurements that can
be implemented jointly pairwise but not triplewise – is
something that is not found among projective measure-
ments in quantum theory. This prompts the question:
why does quantum theory not have this sort of comple-
mentarity? It might be interesting, for instance, to de-
duce the information-processing power of a foil theory
incorporating such correlations. Furthermore, even if we
consider a kind of complementarity that can be accom-
modated in quantum theory, such as five measurements
that can be measured in adjacent pairs, there is an in-
teresting question about why the correlations exhibited
by quantum theory are not stronger. Why is quantum
theory not more contextual or more nonlocal [17, 53–62]?
The same sort of question arises for quantum examples of
triples of nonprojective measurements that can be imple-
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mented pairwise but not triplewise. Why can these not
yield the strength of anti-correlations required to obtain
a no-go theorem for generalized noncontextuality? We
hope that these questions might provide a new angle on
the problem of deriving the structure of quantum theory
from within a landscape of operational foil theories.
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Appendix A: Explicit form of OS correlations in the
double-query, 3-box system
Perfect negative correlation in the outcomes of the
joint observables M12,M13 and M23 constrains their
statistics to be of the form
p(0, 1|M12;P∗) = q12, p(1, 0|M12;P∗) = 1− q12,
p(0, 1|M13;P∗) = q13, p(1, 0|M13;P∗) = 1− q13,
p(0, 1|M23;P∗) = q23, p(1, 0|M23;P∗) = 1− q23
(A1)
for 0 ≤ q12, q13, q23 ≤ 1. This fixes the statistics for the
individual measurements M1, M2 and M3 through the
marginals of Eq. (A1). Specifically,
p(0|M1;P∗) =
∑
X2
p(0, X2|M12;P∗) = q12, (A2)
=
∑
X3
p(0, X3|M13;P∗) = q13, (A3)
p(0|M2;P∗) =
∑
X1
p(X1, 0|M12;P∗) = 1− q12, (A4)
=
∑
X3
p(0, X3|M23;P∗) = q23, (A5)
p(0|M3;P∗) =
∑
X1
p(X1, 0|M13;P∗) = 1− q13, (A6)
=
∑
X2
p(X2, 0|M23;P∗) = 1− q23 (A7)
All together, we find that we must have
q12 = q13 = q23 =
1
2
,
which implies that the correlations are of the form of
Eq. (5).
Appendix B: Proof of theorem 6
Here, we provide the proof of theorem 6 as follows.
Proof. By measurement noncontextuality, the response
function depends only on the equivalence class of a mea-
surement procedure. By outcome determinism, the re-
sponse function for every measurementMS is determin-
istic, so that p (XS|MS ;λ) ∈ {0, 1} . In particular, this
is true for singleton sets. It follows that
p (XS |MS ;λ) =
∏
s∈S
p (Xs|Ms;λ) . (B1)
We can then define a joint distribution p (X1...XN |λ)
yielding the correct marginals by the product of the single
measurement response functions,
p (X1...XN |λ) ≡
N∏
s=1
p (Xs|Ms;λ) . (B2)
By assumption of the empirical adequacy of the ontolog-
ical model, there exists a distribution p(λ|P) for all P ,
such that∫
dλp (XS |MS , λ) p(λ|P) = p (XS|MS ;P) . (B3)
Using p(λ|P), we can define
p (X1...XN |P) =
∫
dλp (X1...XN |λ) p(λ|P) (B4)
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which has marginal on XS of
p (XS |P) =
∑
Xν :ν /∈S
p (X1...XN |P)
=
∫
dλ
∑
Xν :ν /∈S
p (X1...XN |λ) p(λ|P)
=
∫
dλp (XS |MS , λ) p(λ|P)
= p (XS |MS ;P) (B5)
We have therefore shown that p (X1...XN |P) is a joint
distribution whose marginals yield the operational statis-
tics of all measurements.
Appendix C: Maximal quantum violation of the
n-box-set Klyachko-type Kochen-Specker inequality
To see that Squantumn given in Eq. (27) is indeed the
strongest possible quantum violation of inequality (22), it
suffices to consider the following polynomial of Hermitian
operators
Bˆn =
n∑
a=1
X¯aX¯a⊕1, (C1)
and note that for arbitrary Hermitian operators satisfy-
ing the commutation relation [X¯a, X¯a⊕1] = 0, we have
Bˆn − n
(
1− 4 cos
pi
n
1 + cos pin
)
1ˆ
=
1
4
(
2− sec π
n
) n∑
a=1
[
1ˆ− (X¯a)2]+ 1
4
n∑
a=1
[
1ˆ− (X¯aX¯a⊕1)2]
+
1
4
sec
π
n
n∑
a=1
X¯aX¯a⊕2
[
1ˆ− (X¯a⊕1)2]
+
1
4n
(
1 + sec
π
n
)
v†0v0 +
1
n
∑
k=1,2
n∑
j=1
λkjv
†
kjvkj , (C2)
where
v0 = n
(
3− 2 sec2 π
2n
)
1ˆ+
n∑
a=1
X¯aX¯a⊕1,
v1j =
n∑
a=1
ωjan X¯a, v2j =
n∑
a=1
ωjan X¯aX¯a⊕1
ωn = e
−i2pi/n is the n-th root of unity, λ2n = 0, and
λ1j =
(
1 + cos
2πj
n
sec
π
n
)
sin2
πj
n
, j = 1, . . . , n,
λ2j =
1
4
(
1 + cos
2πj
n
sec
π
n
)
, j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
It is straightforward to check that λ1j and λ2j are non-
negative for all j. Thus, for dichotomic Hermitian observ-
ables that also satisfy
(
X¯a
)2
= 1ˆ, the right-hand-side of
Eq. (C2) become a sum of non-negative Hermitian oper-
ators and hence non-negative. As a result, the smallest
eigenvalue of Bˆn is lower bounded by n
(
1− 4 cos
pi
n
1+cos
pi
n
)
,
therefore making Squantumn given in Eq. (27) the strongest
possible quantum violation of inequality (22).
Appendix D: Explicit form of correlations in the
separated pair of single-query 3-box systems
Here, we will give a simple proof that after taking into
account of the no-signaling condition, the nonlcoal OS
correlations have to take the form of Eq. (35).
First, note that by virtue of satisfying Eq. (33), the
nonlocal OS correlations may be written as
∀a 6= b : p(0, 1|Ma,Mb;P∗) = qab
p(1, 0|Ma,Mb;P∗) = 1− qab
∀a = b : p(0, 0|Ma,Mb;P∗) = qab
p(1, 1|Ma,Mb;P∗) = 1− qab, (D1)
where 0 ≤ qab ≤ 1. These joint probabilities are depicted
in Table I.
B1 B2 B3
0 1 0 1 0 1
A1
0 q11 0 0 q12 0 q13
1 0 1-q11 1-q12 0 1-q13 0
A2
0 0 q21 q22 0 0 q23
1 1-q21 0 0 1-q22 1-q23 0
A3
0 0 q31 0 q32 q33 0
1 1-q31 0 1-q32 0 0 1-q33
TABLE I. Joint conditional probability distributions
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) of Eq. (D1) for all pairs of values of
a and b. Along the horizontal (vertical) are the three choices
of measurement on the B(A) wing together with the two out-
comes for each.
Now we consider the consequences of the no-signaling
conditions of Eq. (34). From the independence on b of∑
Bb
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P), we deduce that
qa1 = qa2 = qa3, (D2)
implying that the joint distributions can be made to de-
pend on just three parameters, which we will denote by
sa = qab. It then follows from the independence on a of∑
Aa
p(Aa, Bb|Ma,Mb;P) that
sa = 1− sa, (D3)
which implies that sa =
1
2 for all a, and therefore qab =
1
2
for all a, b. It follows that the nonlocal OS correlations
must be of the form given in Eq. (35) if they are to be
non-signaling.
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Appendix E: Maximum quantum violation of the
n-box-set Bell-Mermin inequality
In general, the problem of determining the maximal
quantum violation of a Bell inequality is highly non-
trivial (see, for example, Refs. [23, 63, 64] and references
therein). Here, we will show that Rquantumn defined in
Eq. (46) is indeed the maximal winning probability, cf.
Eq. (43), allowed in quantum mechanics. To this end, it
suffices to show that the winning probability Rn is up-
per bounded by Rquantumn in quantum theory. For conve-
nience, we will show this in terms of
Sn ≡
n∑
a=1
〈A¯aB¯a〉 −
∑
a,b:b=a⊕1
〈A¯aB¯b〉 −
∑
a,b:a=b⊕1
〈A¯aB¯b〉,
(E1)
which can be re-expressed as:
Sn = 6n
(
Rn − 1
2
)
, (E2)
using Eq. (38).
Now, consider the Bell operator [65] corresponding to
above expression defining Sn:
Bˆ[n]NLOS =
n∑
a=1
A¯aB¯a −
∑
a,b:b=a⊕1
A¯aB¯b −
∑
a,b:a=b⊕1
A¯aB¯b.
(E3)
Following a procedure very similar to that described in
Sec. III of Ref. [66] (see also Ref. [23]), one finds that for
arbitrary Hermitian observables {A¯a}na=1 and {B¯b}nb=1
satisfying
[
A¯a, B¯b
]
= 0,
nλn+1
2
1ˆ− Bˆ[n]NLOS
=
1
2
n∑
a=1
[(
λn+1
2
+ λa
)
v†a−va− +
(
λn+1
2
− λa
)
v†a+va+
]
+
1
2
λn+1
2
{
n∑
a=1
[
1ˆ− (A¯a)2]+ n∑
b=1
[
1ˆ− (B¯b)2]
}
, (E4)
where
va± =
1√
2n
n∑
k=1
ωakn
(
A¯k ± B¯k
)
, λa = 1− 2 cos 2π
n
a,
(E5)
and ωn = e
−i2pi/n.
It is easy to verify that
max
a∈{1,2,...,n}
λa = λn+1
2
= 4 cos2
π
2n
− 1. (E6)
Thus, Eq. (E4) implies that whenever the constraints(
A¯a
)2
= 1ˆ and
(
B¯b
)2
= 1ˆ are satisfied for all a, b ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, the right hand side of Eq. (E4) becomes a
sum of squares of polynomial of Hermitian operators and
hence n
(
4 cos2 pi2n − 1
)
1ˆ − Bˆ[n]NLOS ≥ 0. As a result, the
maximal quantum mechanical expectation value of Bˆ[n]NLOS
is upper bounded by n
(
4 cos2 pi2n − 1
)
, so is the maximal
value of Sn allowed in quantum theory.
Equivalently, it follows from Eq. (E2) that in quan-
tum theory, the maximal winning probabilityRn is upper
bounded by:
1
2
+
1
6n
× n
(
4 cos2
π
2n
− 1
)
=
1
3
+
2
3
cos2
π
2n
. (E7)
which is just Rquantumn given in Eq. (46).
Appendix F: Necessary and sufficient conditions for
joint measurability of noisy spin observables
Theorem 13. Consider a set of noisy spin observables
along the axes nˆk, that is, a set of POVMS
{
EkXk
}
with
Xk ∈ {+1,−1} of the form
EkXk =
1
2
1ˆ+
1
2
~σ ·Xkηnˆk. (F1)
Defining 2N different 3-vectors
~mX1...XN ≡
N∑
k=1
Xknˆk, (F2)
a necessary condition for the spin observables to be jointly
measurable is that
η ≤ 1
N
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |2∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |
(F3)
and a sufficient condition is that
η ≤ 2
N∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |
. (F4)
Proof. Clearly,
η = Tr
[
(~σ ·Xknˆk)EkXk
]
. (F5)
But given that this equality holds for both values of Xk
and for all k, we have
η =
1
2N
N∑
k=1
∑
Xk
Tr
[
(~σ ·Xknˆk)EkXk
]
. (F6)
Recall that joint measurability of POVMs
{
EkXk
}
for
different k implies the existence of another POVM
{EX1X2...XN } such that
EkXk =
∑
X1...XN , fix Xk
EX1...XN (F7)
Consequently,
η =
1
2N
∑
X1...XN
Tr
[(
~σ ·
N∑
k=1
Xknˆk
)
EX1...XN
]
. (F8)
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Defining ~mX1...XN as above, we may write η as
η =
1
2N
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |Tr [(~σ · mˆX1...XN )EX1...XN ] .
(F9)
where mˆX1...XN = ~mX1...XN /|~mX1...XN |. We then note
that
Tr [(~σ · mˆX1...XN )EX1...XN ] ≤ Tr [EX1...XN ] (F10)
to obtain the inequality
η ≤ 1
2N
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |Tr [EX1...XN ] . (F11)
We need only determine the maximum value of the right-
hand-side in a variation over all POVMs {EX1...XN } .
Given that
∑
X1...XN
EX1...XN = 1ˆ, we know that∑
X1...XN
Tr [EX1...XN ] = 2. Consequently, the 2
N -
dimensional vector
(
1
2Tr [EX1...XN ]
)
X1...XN
has unit 1-
norm. Thinking of
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |Tr [EX1...XN ] as
a scalar product, we see that it is maximized by taking(
1
2Tr [EX1...XN ]
)
X1...XN
to be a unit vector parallel to
(|~mX1...XN |)X1...XN with unit 1-norm, that is,
1
2
Tr [EX1...XN ] =
|~mX1...XN |∑
X′1...X
′
N
|~mX′
1
...X′
N
| , (F12)
which yields the necessary condition on η, Eq. (F3).
To derive the sufficient condition, Eq. (F4), we con-
struct a POVM that jointly measures a set of spin ob-
servables with value of η saturating the inequality. Any
set of observables with smaller η can then be jointly mea-
sured by simply adding uniformly random noise to this
POVM.
The simulating POVM is
EX1...XN =
2|~mX1...XN |∑
X′1...X
′
N
|~mX′
1
...X′
N
|
[
1
2
1ˆ+
1
2
~σ · mˆX1...XN
]
.
(F13)
It suffices to demonstrate that this is indeed a POVM
and that it coarse-grains to the appropriate noisy spin
observables. First, note that
∑
X1...XN
~mX1...XN =
∑
X1...XN

 N∑
j=1
Xj nˆj


=
N∑
j=1
nˆj
( ∑
X1...XN
Xj
)
= 0.
while
∑
{Xi}i6=k
~mX1...XN =
∑
{Xi}i6=k

 N∑
j=1
Xj nˆj


=
N∑
j=1
nˆj

 ∑
{Xi}i6=k
Xj


= nˆk2
N−1Xk.
Also, note that because ~mX1...Xk...XN =
−~m−X1···−Xk···−XN , it follows that |~mX1...XN | =
|~m−X1···−XN | and consequently that∑
{Xi}i6=k
|~mX1...XN | =
1
2
∑
X1...XN
|~mX1...XN |. (F14)
It is then easy to verify that
∑
X1...XN
EX1...XN =
∑
X1...XN
2|~mX1...XN |∑
X′1...X
′
N
|~mX′
1
...X′
N
|
×
[
1
2
1ˆ+
1
2
~σ · mˆX1...XN
]
= 1ˆ,
and that∑
{Xi}i6=k
EX1...XN =
∑
{Xi}i6=k
2|~mX1...XN |∑
X′1...X
′
N
|~mX′1...X′N |
×
[
1
2
1ˆ+
1
2
~σ · mˆX1...XN
]
=
1
2
1ˆ+
1
2
~σ · 2
N∑
X′
1
...X′
N
|~mX′1...X′N |
Xknˆk.
This establishes the sufficient condition.
Corollary 14. The necessary and sufficient conditions
for joint measurability of a set of spin observables are:
for a pair of orthogonal spin axes,
η ≤ 1√
2
, (F15)
for a triple of orthogonal spin axes,
η ≤ 1√
3
, (F16)
for a pair of trine spin axes,
η ≤
√
3− 1, (F17)
for a triple of trine spin axes,
η ≤ 2
3
. (F18)
To saturate each of these inequalities, it suffices to im-
plement the POVM defined in Eq. (F13).
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Proof. We begin by establishing the values of
{|~mX1...XN |} for each of our four examples. For
orthogonal spin axes, defined in Eq. (94), we have for
N = 2,
∀X1, X2 : |~mX1X2 | = |X1nˆ1 +X2nˆ2| =
√
2, (F19)
and for N = 3,
∀X1, X2, X3 : |~mX1X2X3 | (F20)
= |X1nˆ1 +X2nˆ2 +X3nˆ3| =
√
3.
For trine spin axes, defined in Eq. (100), we have for
N = 2,
|~m++| = |~m−−| = 1, (F21)
|~m+−| = |~m−+| =
√
3, (F22)
and for N = 3, we have (making use of the fact that
nˆi + nˆj = −nˆk for i, j, k distinct),
|~m+++| = |~m−−−| = 0, (F23)
|~m++−| = |~m−−+| = |~m+−+|
= |~m−+−| = |~m−++| = |~m+−−| = 2. (F24)
It is then straightforward to verify in each case that the
necessary and sufficient conditions on η, Eqs. (F3) and
(F4), coincide and yield the bounds given in Eqs. (F15)-
(F18). We have already shown that the bound of the
sufficient condition is saturated by the POVM of Eq.
(100).
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